



City of Long Beach Citizen Police Complaint Commission Independent Evaluation Final Report

FEBRUARY 2022

POLIS SOLUTIONS & CHANGE-INTEGRATION CONSULTING





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Executive Summary

In April 2021, the City of Long Beach awarded Polis Solutions and Change Integration Consulting, hereafter referred to as the “Polis-Change Integration team,” with a contract to help optimize civilian oversight of the Long Beach Police Department in a manner that supports the continuous improvement of accountability, transparency, and public trust in policing.

Police-community trust stands at a historic crossroads across America, and real, measurable progress in addressing community concerns demands a new level of innovation. Communities expect increased standards for accountability and transparency that are both evidence-based and lean towards criminal justice reform. It is from this perspective that we viewed the City of Long Beach (City) Racial Equity and Reconciliation Initiative and its goal of rethinking the police’s approach to community safety, including the redesign of police oversight and accountability through improved complaint and discipline practices. This review of the Citizen’s Police Complaint Commission (CPC) was an outgrowth of the City’s work on the Initiative, including listening sessions with a diverse cross-section of community stakeholders, a desire to cultivate a police culture that serves in partnership with the community, and recognition that improving community-police trust and racial and social equity requires sustained commitment and myriad strategic actions. Also, since CPC was established over thirty years ago and now has a mature infrastructure with policies and protocols in place for accomplishing its mission, it was timely to evaluate ways it might continue to evolve by enhancing its efficiency and responsiveness to changing community priorities.

In this report, we share how the Polis-Change Integration team collaborated with the City of Long Beach and community stakeholders to facilitate a deliberative process for assessing how police complaints are currently handled and alternative approaches available, and by providing recommendations and a roadmap forward for making improvements.

Objectives of the Evaluation

There were four objectives of this project: (1) Optimize, to the fullest extent practicable, CPC operations in accordance with current City Charter Provisions and prevailing laws, ordinances, and regulations; (2) Review other civilian police oversight models and identify options to redesign police oversight operations that will further enhance accountability and transparency in alignment with City and community expectations; (3) Identify any related legislative priorities that may be necessary to realize recommended reforms; and, (4) Create an implementation roadmap that identifies the necessary actions, timeline, and resources to realize recommended reforms, including amendments to the City Charter.

Methodology

To achieve these four objectives, the Polis-Change Integration team engaged collaboratively with the City’s project team and Long Beach stakeholders. A multi-method approach was used in conducting this evaluation and included conducting interviews with both internal and external stakeholders, reviewing related policies, documents, and training materials, observing CPC meetings in open and closed session, assessing case briefings discussed in closed session, receiving a case management demonstration, observing a Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Internal Affairs (IA) case review session, considering responses to an on-line survey inviting written input on the evaluation, reviewing media articles and emails from community members related to policing in Long Beach and the CPC, and conducting three community listening sessions, including one to get feedback on our preliminary findings and recommendations.



Summary of Recommendations

Although civilian oversight programs have been around for more than a century,¹ there is little research on the factors that influence the effectiveness of these programs, including whether different oversight approaches have greater or less impact on officer misconduct or organizational reform.² This lack of research is at least partially a function of how each civilian oversight structure and process is uniquely responsive to the communities and police agencies it is meant to serve. Local and state legislation, union contract agreements, officer bill of rights, and city charters all shape a specific civilian oversight program, along with political dynamics, budget resources, and other factors. Along with this variability between different oversight entities, the civilian oversight field is rapidly evolving, which also contributes to the difficulty in researching the effectiveness of oversight models.³ “Just as there is no best model of oversight that will work for all jurisdictions, there is no single set of best practices that are guaranteed to be more successful in achieving civilian oversight’s goals of improving law enforcement’s accountability, transparency, and relationship with the communities it serves.”⁴

Given the unique complexities associated with civilian oversight, researchers and practitioners have increasingly focused on developing criteria or a framework to use as evaluative standards or principles for assessing outcomes. For example, it is generally agreed among police oversight practitioners that civilian oversight programs grounded in attributes like collaboration, transparency, and authority often have the greatest impact in affecting change. These attributes and other principles discussed in this report guided the Police-Change Integration evaluation of CPCC and recommended changes.

Shared accountability is an important aspect in police reform. ***Both communities and police agencies must acknowledge that civilian oversight of police is just one piece to the larger puzzle that is police reform and not the panacea to addressing all police misconduct or organizational and operational changes required, regardless of the presence of an oversight program.*** For example, the recent emphasis on involving mental health practitioners in law enforcement’s response to incidents involving individuals in crisis is developing largely independent from the role of civilian oversight in policing. Ultimately, it is a collaboration and willingness of agencies and communities to come together to impart change that can have far greater impacts on organizational culture and community satisfaction.

Based on the purpose and principles of civilian oversight summarized above, input from all stakeholders, review of other data collected, and the consultants’ experience and expertise, the Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the City of Long Beach use a new approach to police oversight involving an Auditor/Monitor hybrid model and a Police Oversight Commission.

¹ De Angelis, Joseph, Richard Rosenthal, and Brian Buchner. *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: A Review of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models*. Washington D.C.: Office of Justice Programs. 2016.

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/161/attachments/original/1481727977/NACOLE_short_doc_FINAL.pdf?1481727977

² Ibid., 9.

³ Vitoroulis, Michael, Cameron McElhiney, and Liana Perez. *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field and Effective Oversight Practices*. Washington D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2021. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0952-pub.pdf>

⁴ Ibid., 60.



The Auditor/Monitor model is grounded in collaboration between communities and their police agencies, as a Police Auditor/Monitor necessarily requires broad access to police records, data, and personnel to conduct systemic reviews and audits of policies, training, uses of force, complaints, and operational practices in general. These systemic reviews and audits built on ready access to all departmental information and processes lead to broad organizational change, “one of the most important themes” in police accountability today.⁵ The Police Auditor/Monitor will regularly audit Internal Affairs complaint investigations, with access to all information gathered by Internal Affairs, including body worn camera footage, and authority to sit in on officer interviews, to ensure Internal Affairs handles complaints expeditiously, thoroughly, and fairly. The Police Auditor/Monitor also will have the power to investigate certain complaints, such as those involving the Chief of Police, and will have access to all relevant evidence and the authority to question all witnesses, including LBPD officers, rather than being focused on investigating only civilian complaints as has been the case with CPCC. The Police Auditor/Monitor also will have authority to go to the scene of a critical incident, such as an officer-involved shooting, to observe the incident investigation, and have the authority to review all major uses of force.⁶

Under this model, the Police Auditor/Monitor will actively collaborate with the Police Oversight Commission, to ensure continuing input from the community about the direction of police oversight in Long Beach. The Commission will continue to hold regular meetings and Commission members will conduct community outreach to actively engage with the Long Beach community, both educating the public about oversight accomplishments and soliciting input on issues of concern to help in setting priorities for the work of the Auditor/Monitor. Where policy, training, or other operational recommendations are being considered by the Police Auditor/Monitor, the Police Oversight Commission will be consulted before a final recommendation is made, to review the need for change, alternative approaches, the merits of the recommended approach, and whether further community input on the matter is advised. The Commission will be briefed by the Police Auditor/Monitor and LBPD on high profile incidents or other matters of particular concern for the Commission and community. See Section V. Recommendations for more information on the Police Oversight Commission and Police Auditor/Monitor hybrid model recommended.

Implementing a new oversight model will take time and as such the Polis-Change Integration team has included in this report recommendations for improvement of the CPCC that can and should be enacted in the short term. Implementing these interim recommendations will reflect the City’s commitment to improving the CPCC and eventual establishment of a new oversight model to better suit the needs of the community. Key recommendations for short term changes to the CPCC include exploring and instituting various methods to increase transparency with complainants throughout the investigatory process; establishing a written agreement between the CPCC and the LBPD Internal Affairs to formally document their processes and information sharing procedures; addressing perceived or actual conflicts of interest

⁵ Walker, Samuel, and Carol Archbold. *The New World of Police Accountability*. Second edition. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 21.

⁶ Note that Assembly Bill 1506 (AB 1506) became effective July 1, 2021, establishing California Police Shooting Investigation Teams (CaPSITs) to investigate qualifying incidents, including officer involved shootings resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian. The creation of CaPSIT should not replace the responsibility of the LBPD and the Auditor/Monitor under the recommended model to conduct their own investigation and review.



in the CPCC and the LBPD relationship with the City Manager’s Office; and increasing transparency of CPCC operations with the community by improving its website, reporting, and community outreach efforts.

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I. Introduction

The killing of George Floyd sparked a renewed outcry about racial inequities and demands for police reform across the country. The Long Beach community, like many others, spoke out condemning systemic racial inequities in many aspects of government. In June 2020, the Long Beach City Council unanimously adopted a Framework for Reconciliation.⁷ This Framework included four key steps to ending systemic racism: 1) Acknowledging; 2) Listening; 3) Convening; and 4) Catalyzing. Since then, the City has taken a variety of actions to work towards achieving the mission established under the Framework. One such goal that arose from this important work was to *redesign police approach to community safety*. This goal included four strategies, one of which directly related to the Citizen Police Complaint Commission (CPC): *Redesign police oversight and accountability through improved complaint and discipline practices*. Actions assigned to this practice included *engaging a formal outside expert study of the CPC to identify necessary changes to its structure and explore creation of a new civilian police oversight body based on models from other California municipalities*.

In April 2021, the City of Long Beach awarded Polis Solutions and Change Integration Consulting (Polis-Change Integration team) with a contract to help optimize civilian oversight of the Long Beach Police Department in a manner that supports the continuous improvement of accountability, transparency, and public trust in policing.

The Polis-Change Integration team understands that police-community trust and confidence in policing across America is low, particularly among youth and minority populations⁸, and believes that real, measurable progress demands a new level of innovation. The Polis-Change Integration team also appreciates that the CPC was established over thirty years ago and now has a mature infrastructure with policies and protocols in place for accomplishing its mission, while also continuing to evolve by enhancing its efficiency and responsiveness to changing community priorities. In this report, we share details about how the Polis-Change Integration team collaborated with City of Long Beach stakeholders in a deliberative process to assess how police complaints are currently handled, consider alternative approaches, and recommend a roadmap for making improvements moving forward.

Objectives of the Evaluation

The four objectives for this project are listed below. These objectives established the scope of the evaluation and provided focus for each activity and task carried out by the team.

- (1) Optimize, to the fullest extent practicable, CPC operations in accordance with current City Charter Provisions and prevailing laws, ordinance, and regulations.
- (2) Review other civilian police oversight models and identify options to redesign police oversight operations that will further enhance accountability and transparency in alignment with City and community expectations.

⁷ City of Long Beach. *Racial Equity and Reconciliation Initiative: Initial Report*.

<https://www.longbeach.gov/globalassets/health/media-library/documents/healthy-living/office-of-equity/reconciliation/report-racial-equity-and-reconciliation-initiative>

⁸ Jones, Jeffrey. *Blacks, Whites' Confidence Diverges Most on Police*. Gallup.com. August 12, 2020.

<https://news.gallup.com/poll/317114/black-white-adults-confidence-diverges-police.aspx>



(3) Identify any related legislative priorities that may be necessary to realize recommended reforms.

(4) Create an implementation roadmap that identifies the necessary actions, timeline, and resources to realize recommended reforms, including amendments to the City Charter.

Methodology

To achieve these four objectives, the Polis-Change Integration team engaged collaboratively with the City's project team to develop a work plan that was updated as needed throughout the evaluation. The Polis-Change Integration team also provided the City's project team with bi-weekly status updates and held regularly scheduled monthly meetings, along with continually interacting with the City's project team as issues and questions came up. The Polis-Change Integration team engaged collaboratively with the City's project team, the Long Beach Police Department, and Long Beach stakeholders.

A mixed-method approach was used for this evaluation that included conducting interviews, reviewing related policies, procedures, and legislation, observing CPCC meetings in open and closed session, reviewing cases investigated by the CPCC, reviewing responses to an online survey seeking input on CPCC experiences, observing an Internal Affairs complaint investigation review attended by the Chief of Police, Deputy Chiefs, Commanders, and others, and conducting three community listening sessions, including one to solicit feedback on our preliminary findings and recommendations. These methods are further detailed below.

Review of Policies, Procedures, and Related Legislation

The team's review of policies, procedures, and related local and state legislation provided the foundation for its work on the evaluation of the CPCC. Documents reviewed also included case files, training materials, the LBPDP Policy Manual, examples of findings memos, letters to complainants, acknowledgement letters, subpoenas, a complaint form, LBPDP training bulletins, CPCC Annual Reports, the Racial Equity and Reconciliation Initiative Report, and the CPCC Charter Amendment, By-laws, and Policies. The team also received and reviewed email communications and historical and current media articles concerning CPCC, LBPDP, and this evaluation process.

Review of these documents provided both legal and operational context for understanding how the CPCC oversight program was developed and its current structure and processes. These documents also served as a primary resource in the development of the process map. Further, issues and areas of improvement identified by the team in reviewing the documents, contributed to the framework and basis for our findings and recommendations. It should be further noted that many of the areas for improvement identified in our review of these documents were validated by our observations, as well as the perspectives offered in the internal and external stakeholder interviews and community listening sessions.

Stakeholder Interviews

As part of the evaluation, the Polis-Change Integration team conducted approximately 30 interviews with both internal and external stakeholders. Interviews were conducted with the CPCC Manager and staff, past and current CPCC Commissioners, counsel from the City Attorney's Office, the Civil Service Director, the Deputy City Manager, the Internal Affairs Commander, and the Long Beach Chief of Police and his Chief of Staff. In addition to the internal stakeholders interviewed, the Polis-Change Integration team met with approximately 100 members of the community by way of one-on-one interviews or through listening sessions, as noted below. Community members interviewed initially were



identified by the City of Long Beach. The Polis-Change Integration team also solicited and spoke to members of the community who were recommended by interviewees.

The overarching objective of all internal and external interviews was to gather perspectives on what was working well with the current CPCC oversight structure, where improvements were suggested, and attributes of a successful civilian oversight program in Long Beach. Some interviews included a focus on specific aspects of the misconduct complaint handling process, such as ways that the CPCC and Internal Affairs interface, the role of the City Manager’s Office in making final dispositions on cases, and Civil Service appeal options for some types of discipline. When past and current CPCC Commissioners and CPCC staff were interviewed, the team also was interested in issues such as training, case management, and approaches to preparing, presenting, and reviewing investigation files. As previously noted, the opinions, thoughts, and perspectives offered by interviewees and during listening sessions confirmed the areas for improvements to the process and the limitations in the fundamental structure of the CPCC. The team conducted a final round of interviews with City and CPCC staff to share our preliminary findings and recommendations and to help in determining if anything had been overlooked.

On-site Observations

In addition to the interviews and document review, the Polis-Change Integration team also virtually attended 7 CPCC Commission meetings, both open and closed sessions. This allowed the team to observe the complaint process and procedures in practice and gave light to the various ways in which the process was effective and where it could be improved.

Members of the team also attended an Internal Affairs review meeting conducted by the Long Beach Police Department. This meeting was informative to the team in terms of better understanding the internal review processes for police misconduct cases.

The Polis-Change Integration team also received a case management demonstration by the CPCC Manager, which illustrated the process that the CPCC follows when intaking and investigating a complaint as well as how complaints are tracked to ensure that investigation deadlines are met.

Case Reviews

As part of the team’s observation of CPCC Commission meetings, the team reviewed case files that were discussed in each meeting, which were provided to the Commissioners and team on the Friday before each Thursday monthly meeting. Seventy-four files were provided to the Polis-Change Integration team for review over the evaluation period. Much like our observation of the CPCC Commission meetings, review of these files provided context to the CPCC investigatory and review process and helped in identifying aspects of the CPCC process that appear to be working effectively and where there is room for improvement.

Community Listening Sessions

In addition to the above evaluation methods, the Polis-Change Integration team initially conducted two community listening sessions to solicit input from previously unidentified external stakeholders wanting to share their perspectives and experiences with CPCC. The first was conducted virtually and the second in-person and hosted by the City of Long Beach. These sessions provided community members an opportunity to voice their concerns about the CPCC and provided the team with additional perspectives on the complaint process, understanding of the CPCC and its mission, and input



on elements important for civilian oversight to be effective in Long Beach. These community listening sessions also emphasized the need for the City of Long Beach and CPCC to provide more opportunities for community members to make their voices heard and the need to engage the community more extensively on issues related to police reform and civilian oversight. These areas and recommendations for improved community engagement are further explored in Section V. Recommendations.

Benchmarking Study

The Polis-Change Integration team conducted a benchmarking study of twenty-six (26) oversight programs within the State of California and four (4) other agencies in similarly sized jurisdictions outside of California. The objective of this study was to better understand a range of data points concerning various oversight models and to comprehensively compare these programs to that of the City of Long Beach’s CPCC, including approaches taken in interpreting the impact of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act legislation on oversight initiatives. Ultimately, the team focused on five (5) California oversight programs, all in jurisdictions of similar size as Long Beach. This information allowed the team to identify gaps and areas for improvement with the CPCC, as well as highlight aspects of oversight programs to consider in any recommendations for a change in the Long Beach oversight model.

CPCC Process Map

The Team also utilized the information gathered in the above listed efforts to develop a process map to better understand and illustrate the CPCC complaint process from beginning to end, how CPCC interfaces with Internal Affairs and the City Manager’s Office, and the point at which appeals of discipline can be taken to the Civil Service Commission. The process map, like the benchmarking study, allowed the team to identify the pinch points in the process, as well as steps in the process that worked well.

What is Civilian Oversight?

In a report of research on civilian oversight that was jointly sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and the National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), the authors stated, “Civilian oversight may be defined as one or more individuals outside the sworn chain of command of a police department whose work focuses on holding that department and its officers and employees accountable.”⁹


Civilian oversight of law enforcement varies greatly, with no two identical oversight agencies. However, three overarching models of oversight are used as a frame of reference: review-focused, investigation-focused, and auditor/monitor-focused. Each model brings pros and cons, and many cities are increasingly adopting hybrid models which combine attributes of two or all three models (see Figure 1). More details about each of the three models as well as several hybrid models is provided in Section III. Benchmarking Study.

⁹ De Angelis, Joseph, Richard Rosenthal, and Brian Buchner. *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*. Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs. 2016.
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/161/attachments/original/1481727974/NACOLE_Accessing_theEvidence_Final.pdf?1481727974

Figure 1. Civilian Oversight Models

Civilian Oversight Models

(3 Primary Models + Hybrid Models)



Organization of the Report

This report encompasses 6 Sections. Section II. About the CPCC, provides background on the CPCC and its current framework. This section also includes a map of the complaint process from intake to appeal. Section III. Benchmarking Study is devoted to a review of our benchmarking study and its related findings. Findings from the benchmarking study are also used to inform the recommendations. An overview of the different civilian oversight models is also provided within this section. Section IV. Findings, documents the findings from our evaluation of both the inherent and functional limitations to the CPCC. Finally, Section V. Recommendations, outlines our recommendations. As explained below, our recommendations are categorized along two pathways. The first and primary subsection of this section outlines our recommendations for a new oversight model for the City of Long Beach and the second subsection focuses on the interim changes that can be made to the CPCC whilst the new oversight model undergoes creation and development.

Key Recommendations

Although civilian oversight programs have been around for more than a century,¹⁰ little research on the effectiveness of these programs has been completed. Much of this is due to the fact that civilian oversight and its effectiveness is so unique to the communities and cities it is meant to serve. Legislation, union contract agreements, the existence of an officer bill of rights, and city charters are all examples of

¹⁰ Ibid.

influences that need to be considered in shaping a civilian oversight program. As such, each program must be tailored to its city and community and continuously reassessed to ensure effectiveness.

Although little research on best practice models of civilian oversight has been completed, many cities are increasingly implementing the Auditor/Monitor-focused model or hybrid versions of this model (see Section III. Benchmarking Study). As calls for police reform increase, the need for systemic and organizational change of policing become more apparent. Oftentimes, investigating, reviewing, and issuing discipline in a single incident of misconduct has minimal impact on the broader organizational culture of a police department. Although incident-based outcomes and disciplinary actions may answer calls for accountability and justice in the immediate term, the failure to address underlying cultural and systemic problems that created and allowed for the incident to occur leave communities feeling like their efforts never address all police misconduct, causes of misconduct, or inequitable policing. Similarly, changes to leadership at the executive level often do little to affect change in the underlying culture of a police department.

It is with this in mind that many cities are looking for more comprehensive ways to reform policing and involve the community in affecting this change. In this vein we have seen the number of cities seeking to implement civilian oversight programs significantly increase in the past 1-2 years.¹¹ Also, many localities are examining the many ways in which community members can be incorporated into the review of police misconduct, policies, training, and increased community engagement efforts to create greater oversight and transparency.

Figure 2. Oversight Attributes¹²



¹¹ Vitoroulis, Michael, Cameron McEllhiney, and Liana Perez. *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight: Key Principles and Practices for Effectiveness and Sustainability*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2021. <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0951-pub.pdf>

¹² These attributes are approached slightly differently by other oversight practitioners. For example, NACOLE describes *Thirteen Principals for Effect Oversight*. <https://www.nacole.org/principles>



Civilian oversight programs that are grounded in attributes like collaboration, transparency, and authority often have the greatest impact in affecting change. Shared accountability is an important aspect in civilian oversight and police reform. Both communities and police agencies must acknowledge that civilian oversight of police is just one piece to the larger puzzle that is police reform and not the panacea to addressing all police misconduct. Ultimately, it is this collaboration and willingness to come together to impart change that can have far greater impacts on organizational culture.

The Recommended Oversight Model

It is with the above in mind that the Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the City of Long Beach take a new approach to police oversight and adopt a hybrid of the Auditor/Monitor model that includes a Police Oversight Commission. The Auditor/Monitor model is grounded in collaboration between communities and their police agencies, as a Police Auditor/Monitor necessarily requires broad access to police records, data, and personnel to conduct systemic reviews and audits of policies, training, uses of force, complaints, and operational practices in general. These systemic reviews and audits built on ready access to all departmental information and processes can lead to broad organizational change, “one of the most important themes” in police accountability today.¹³ The Police Auditor/Monitor will regularly audit Internal Affairs complaint investigations, with access to all information gathered by Internal Affairs, including body worn camera footage, and authority to sit in on officer interviews, to ensure Internal Affairs handles complaints expeditiously, thoroughly, and fairly. The Police Auditor/Monitor also will have the power to investigate certain complaints, such as those involving the Chief of Police, and will have access to all relevant evidence and the authority to question all witnesses, including LBPB officers, rather than being focused on investigating all civilian complaints as has been the case with CPCC. The Police Auditor/Monitor will have authority to go to the scene of critical incidents and to review all major uses of force.

Under this model, the Police Auditor/Monitor will collaborate with a Police Oversight Commission to ensure continuing input from the community about the direction of police oversight in Long Beach. The Commission will continue to hold regular meetings and Commission members will conduct community outreach to actively engage with the Long Beach community, both educating the public about oversight accomplishments and soliciting input on issues of concern to help in setting priorities for the work of the Auditor/Monitor. Where policy, training, or other operational recommendations are being considered by the Police Auditor/Monitor, the Police Oversight Commission will be consulted before a final recommendation is made to review the need for change, alternative approaches, the merits of the recommended approach, and whether further community input on the matter is advised. The Commission will be briefed by the Police Auditor/Monitor and LBPB on high profile incidents or other matters of particular concern for the Commission and the community.

Details on the specific framework of this model and restructuring are provided in Section V. Recommendations. Key recommendations for the Auditor/Monitor oversight model include:

- Address systemic issues, analyze patterns and trends, identify deficiencies in operations, policy, procedures, and training (Increased authority).

¹³ Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability*, 21.



- Receive LBPD’s response to Auditor/Monitor’s recommendations within 30 days with a plan to adopt or an explanation as to any rejection, with the City Manager resolving any disagreements. (Increased accountability).
- Audit a sample of completed investigations every month for timeliness, thoroughness, and quality. (Increased review authority).
- On the front-end, review all complaints to ensure appropriate allegations are included (Increased review authority).
- Investigate or review specific types of issues, such as complaints against the Chief or Command Staff, officer-involved-shootings, an in-custody death, or other critical incidents (Refocused and increased investigative authority).
- Review all major uses of force (Increased authority).
- Go to the scene of critical incident investigations (Increased authority).
- Have broad, direct access to departmental information, databases, etc., which will be addressed through written agreement and policy (Increased information and personnel access).
- Recruited and hired by City Council with Police Oversight Commission involvement (Increased independence and transparency).

The Police Oversight Commission will:

- Provide input to Police Auditor/Monitor on setting auditing priorities, and review and approve recommendations from Police Auditor/Monitor (Refocused and increased authority).
- Solicit input from the community on recommendations under consideration, with each Commissioner bringing input from their respective district (Community engagement).
- Receive briefings on high-profile incidents (Increased authority).
- Provide feedback to Police Auditor/Monitor on annual reports with focus on statistical trends and special reports on matters addressed by the Police Auditor/Monitor (Increased transparency).
- Educate and engage with the community and bring community concerns to the attention of Police Auditor/Monitor and LBPD (Community engagement).
- Hold regularly scheduled meetings open to the public, to the extent permitted by law (Community engagement and transparency).

These proposed changes, along with the interim changes recommended below, are aimed at increasing the sense of legitimacy experienced by all stakeholders in the work of civilian oversight in Long Beach and to enhance accountability and transparency, along with other oversight attributes summarized in Figure 2. Whatever oversight model is used in Long Beach, the City should provide for regular reviews of the system to evaluate its effectiveness and ensure that it continues to be responsive to community needs over time.

Interim Changes: Improvements to the CPCC

The Polis-Change Integration team also acknowledges that implementing a new oversight model will take time and has provided recommendations for improvement of the CPCC that it can and should enact in the short term. Implementing these recommendations in the short term will reflect the City’s commitment to improving the CPCC and eventually restructuring the oversight model to best suit the needs of the community. Key recommendations for short term changes to the CPCC include:



- Explore and institute various methods to increase transparency with complainants throughout the investigatory process.
- Increase transparency with the community by improving its website, reporting, and community outreach efforts.
- Provide additional training and orientation to CPCC Commissioners.
- Conduct case fact finding presentations by CPCC Investigators as part of each CPCC Meeting.
- Assign the CPCC its own Deputy City Attorney to serve as legal representation.
- Establish a written agreement between the CPCC and the LBPD Internal Affairs.
- Develop a process to provide more feedback from the City Manager’s Office to the Commission.



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II. About the CPCC

Authority of the Citizen Police Complaint Commission – Charter Amendment Provisions

In 1990, the City of Long Beach electorate voted to amend the City’s Charter to create the Citizen Police Complaint Commission (CPCC). The Charter Amendment provides that the CPCC be composed of eleven (11) members, who are residents of Long Beach and “broadly representative of the racial, ethnic, religious, labor, business, age, gender, sexual orientation, and disabled members of the general public.”¹⁴ Commission members are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by City Council, with one member representing each of the nine City Council districts, and two members appointed at large. Each City Council member is to nominate an individual to represent each respective Council district. The term for each Commissioner is two years, with no person serving more than two full terms.¹⁵

Further, the Charter Amendment provided that the City Manager appoint an Independent Investigator, as needed, “who shall serve at the pleasure of the City Manager.”¹⁶ The Commission, through the Investigator, has authority to receive, administer and investigate, at the direction of the Commission, allegations of police misconduct, with emphasis on excessive force, false arrest, and complaints with racial or sexual overtones. The Investigator is to report the results of investigations to the Commission.¹⁷

Related to the authority to investigate allegations of police misconduct, the Charter Amendment provides that the Commission has powers and duties to:

- Conduct a hearing into allegations of police misconduct, when such hearing, in the discretion of the Commission, will facilitate the fact-finding process. “The hearing process shall be open to the public to the extent legally possible and insofar as it does not conflict with state or federal law.”¹⁸
- Subpoena and require the attendance of witnesses, and the production of books and papers pertinent to the investigation and to administer oaths to such witnesses to the extent permissible by law.
- Make recommendations concerning allegations of misconduct to the City Manager, who shall have final disciplinary authority.
- Recommend to the City Council the provision of such staff as is necessary to carry out its powers and duties, with the City Manager selecting staff members who shall serve at the pleasure of the City Manager.

¹⁴ City of Long Beach, California - Charter, Article XIA, Section 1151. Membership and Terms of Citizen Police Complaint Commission. <https://www.longbeach.gov/citymanager/cpcc/supporting-information/#charter>

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., Section 1152. Independent Investigator.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., Section 1154. Confidentiality.

Figure 3. City of Long Beach Departments Involved in Complaint Investigations

City of Long Beach Departments Involved in Complaint Investigations



Commission By-Laws

The CPCC By-Laws were originally adopted in November 1990 and were last amended in February 2016. The By-Laws address issues and procedures related to the work of the Commission, including definitions; CPCC authority, power, and duties; selection of Commission members; compensation; removal of members from office; when and how meetings will be conducted; investigations and hearings; confidentiality; committees; reports to the City; and amendments. The By-Laws are not addressed in detail in this report, but the following are a sample of the provisions relevant to the Polis-Change Integration team’s findings and recommendations:

- Article IV mandates that the term of office for Commissioners shall be two (2) years and that no Commissioner shall serve more than two (2) terms (though serving an unexpired term is not counted as service of one term).
- Article VII addresses Commission officers, providing that there be at least two – a Chair and a Vice Chair, with the powers and duties of each delineated. An officer is elected for a term of one year and is prohibited from serving more than one year.
- Article VIII provides that the Commission shall hold regular meetings on the second Thursday of each month at 5:30pm, though special meetings can be called by the Chair, or the Vice Chair in the absence of the Chair. All meetings shall be open to the public. Commissioners are required to attend at least one training day/year in their first 60 days after approval as a Commissioner and



new Commissioners shall attend an orientation meeting prior to their participation in their first meeting.

- Article IX addresses investigations and hearings, with the hearing process open to the public to the extent legally possible and if it does not conflict with state or federal law, as required by Section 1153 of the City Charter.
- Article X requires confidentiality of all information generated by the LBPD, information related to the Commissioners deliberations, and other matters.
- Article XII provides that the Commission is to issue an annual report to the Mayor and City Council.

CPCC Policies

The CPCC has established a set of “guidelines for the receipt and processing of allegations of police employee misconduct”¹⁹ as set forth in the City Charter. These policies provide a set of definitions to add to the terms defined in the Commission’s By-Laws, provide information on where and how to file a complaint, note the one-year time limit for filing, and very briefly address steps in a CPCC investigation and the Commission’s review process.

The guidance states, “All complaints shall be conducted in a fair, ethical and objective manner. The investigator is a finder of fact. Personal opinion shall not be contained in the investigator’s report.”²⁰ The investigator’s role as a finder of fact is relevant to Polis-Change Integration’s recommendations regarding ways the CPCC investigator can enhance their presentation of a case brief in writing and at Commission meetings.

The CPCC Policies also provide for the “No Further Action (NFA)” outcome in which the CPCC Director/Manager “can close causes...due to lack of witness cooperation or insufficient information,” with the cases presented on the Commission’s meeting agenda’s consent calendar.²¹ This policy is relevant to interim recommendations on the handling of NFA cases, as the Commission currently requires that they be fully investigated and presented alongside other cases reviewed in the monthly meeting.

The process for holding Commission hearings, issuing subpoenas, questioning witnesses, and securing relevant documents is outlined,²² though as discussed in the Polis-Change Integration team’s findings in Section IV of this report, the Commission does not hold hearings that involve examination of witnesses, though subpoenas for LBPD records relevant to an investigation are issued by CPCC staff.

Finally, the CPCC Policies also address the issue of confidentiality, referral of policy or training suggestions to the City Manager, the range of findings and their definitions, the standard of proof, and credibility factors. A final section refers to the “Fairness of Findings,” with the questions: Were they consistent with the information gathered? Did the credibility determinations make sense? Was the correct standard used (preponderance of evidence)?²³ It is not clear who in the investigation and review process is to consider these “fairness” issues, though the Polis-Change Integration team did not observe the

¹⁹ City of Long Beach, California - Citizen Police Complaint Commission Policies; Section I.

<https://www.longbeach.gov/citymanager/cpcc/supporting-information/#charter>

²⁰ Ibid., Section VI.D.

²¹ Ibid., Section VI.F.

²² Ibid., Section VI.G.

²³ Ibid., at the end of the unnumbered section labeled “Findings.”



Commission discussing the factors in any routine manner as it reviewed cases and made recommended findings.

CPCC Staff and Budget

CPCC currently is staffed by the CPCC Manager²⁴, one full-time Investigator, and one half-time Investigator. CPCC shares an administrative assistant with the Government Affairs Office. CPCC’s operating budget for FY2021 was \$533,497.48, which included salary and benefits for CPCC staff, a percentage of the salary and benefits paid to counsel from the City Attorney’s office who advises CPCC, materials and services supporting the work of CPCC, and miscellaneous other expenses. The FY2021 budget figure also included funds for the contractual evaluation of CPCC handled by the Polis-Change Integration team. CPCC staff are advocating for the funds reserved for the CPCC evaluation to be extended and converted in 2022 to allow for a second full-time investigator. CPCC shares office space with other City services on the first floor of the Long Beach City Hall. Access is restricted, as is access to other offices located at City Hall.

CPCC Complaint Intake, Investigation, and Recommendations on Findings

External civilian complaints alleging LBPB officer misconduct can be filed with the CPCC or the LBPB.²⁵ A complaint can be filed in person or by telephone, mail, or email, and can be made by a person not directly involved in the incident and anonymously. While complaint forms can be downloaded from both the LBPB and CPCC websites, there is no mechanism to file complaints online. Complaints filed with the LBPB are referred to Internal Affairs (IA) for handling. A single complaint can involve multiple allegations of misconduct and can name a single or multiple officers.

CPCC and LBPB IA share copies of all external complaints received with each other, and the two entities conduct parallel investigations into these civilian complaints, regardless of where the complaint was filed originally. CPCC and IA assign different file numbers to the complaint, following their own numbering systems, enter the complaint into their separate case management systems,²⁶ and assign the complaint for investigation. CPCC and IA also each send a letter acknowledging receipt of the complaint and the file number to the complainant, or to the person who filed the complaint on behalf of the complainant.

CPCC does not have direct access to LBPB information such as incident reports, officer statements, dispatch records, or body-worn camera (BWC) video footage associated with the police event that led to

²⁴ The CPCC By-Laws provide for an Executive Director to oversee the work of the Commission and CPCC staff, and to receive allegations of police employee misconduct. An Independent Investigator is defined as the person appointed by the City Manager to receive or investigate misconduct allegations. By-Laws, Article 1. Sections 1.C and D. The CPCC Executive Director’s position was reclassified, along with others in the City Manager’s Office, and changed to Manager in 2019.

²⁵ Internal complaints, generally those filed by a LBPB officer against another officer, or a supervisor concerning a subordinate, can only be filed with and investigated by the LBPB Internal Affairs Division. Information concerning the number of internal complaints filed, the allegations involved, dispositions, and discipline is not shared with CPCC or the public.

²⁶ Both CPCC and Internal Affairs use a case management system called IAPro to track the same complaints and compile investigative evidence, witness statements, and case briefings, though they do not have access to each other’s systems.



a complaint. Thus, as it investigates complaints, CPCC must subpoena information from the LBPB about the incident, along with reaching out to the complainant and witnesses for statements and gathering other evidence that is directly available. However, it is not unusual for an investigation to be referred to the Commission for a recommended finding without all available evidence, because Internal Affairs has not completed its own investigation, even though the timeline for completing an investigation is approaching, or when evidence is determined to be confidential and is withheld from the CPCC. For example, officer statements were not routinely provided to CPCC until January 2021, based on an earlier opinion from the City Attorney's Office that the statements involved personnel information that was to be withheld under the California State legislated Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act.²⁷

The Commission meets on the second Thursday of every month, first in open session and then in closed session, during which it discusses each completed investigation and recommends a finding for each allegation in the complaints reviewed. The Commission can also request more investigation and make recommendations for LBPB officer training or policy changes. Following the closed session, the Commission again meets in open session to report on its recommended findings, though the findings are not publicly attached to a specific complaint, named officer, or file number.

Prior to the monthly meeting, case briefs that include the names of the complainant and involved officers, the complaint allegations, relevant LBPB policy manual sections, and evidence received from the LBPB or collected by CPCC investigators are provided to each CPCC Commissioner on the Friday preceding the monthly Commission meeting. Though CPCC does not have direct access to BWC footage, relevant sections of any available BWC video, footage from private security cameras, or other available video/audio concerning the police incident underlying each complaint are played at the meeting. In CPCC's 2020 Annual Report, which as of the date on this report is still in draft form and has not been released, the Commission listed as a priority getting access to video/audio footage prior to their meetings, though that has not been arranged to date due to confidentiality concerns.

The Commission's recommended findings are forwarded to the Deputy City Manager, who meets with the CPCC Manager to discuss the cases and recommended outcomes. A separate meeting is also held with Internal Affairs after review of their completed investigations. Where there are differences in recommended findings from the CPCC and Internal Affairs, the Deputy City Manager recommends a final disposition to the City Manager and prepares a memorandum explaining their reasoning. Limited information is provided to CPCC on the final findings and reasoning when the Commission's recommendations are not adopted. For example, the City Manager's Report for June 2021 addressed findings recommendations from complaint investigations considered by the Commission at its February 11, 2021, meeting. Without reference to a case number or other means for the Commission to identify which specific investigation was involved, the City Manager reported on *some* of the allegations considered during the February meeting, using the following format:

²⁷https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&division=4.&title=1.&part=&chapter=9.7.&article= CPCC only receives a recording of the officer's statement, requiring CPCC investigators to spend countless hours doing their own transcriptions. As of December 2021, CPCC is seeking a transcription service to contract out this work. Internal Affairs apparently primarily transcribes interviews in investigations of internal complaints, which CPCC does not investigate or review.



Commission	City Manager
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustained – 2 allegations • Other – 0 allegations • Not sustained – 8 allegations • Exonerated – 5 allegations • Unfounded – 9 allegations • Receive and File – 2 allegations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustained – 1 allegation (DI) • Other – 1 allegation (DI) • Not sustained – 6 allegations (AI, DI) • Exonerated – 5 allegations • Unfounded – 11 allegations (AI, DI) • Receive and File – 2 allegations
AI (Additional Confidential Information), DI (Different Interpretation) Reasons for Different Interpretation – Photo evidence in case brief.	

In addition to only reporting on some allegations from cases considered four months earlier, the report is broken down by findings rather than by case, so it is difficult if not impossible for the Commission to know the specific complaint investigation involved in the list noting when the City Manager did not adopt its recommended findings. Though DI – Different Interpretation – is noted for at least four of the differences in recommendations and findings, only one reason is given (photo evidence in case brief), but the explanation is not tied to a findings category or a specific case, and we don’t know if photo evidence provided the reason for a different interpretation in all cases where DI is noted or only in some. Further, not identifying the additional confidential information considered or the piece of evidence that was interpreted differently means that the Commission does not have an opportunity to reconsider its recommended finding in light of this new information, fostering a perception of more disagreement than there actually might be. The Commission loses an opportunity to learn and develop from this added information and perspective, which might otherwise contribute to the soundness of Commission recommendations.

Civil Service Commission Appeals

City of Long Beach employees, including LBPB officers, are entitled to appeal discipline that involves suspension, dismissal, or demotion.²⁸ To appeal a disciplinary decision, officers must file a written notice of appeal and request for a hearing with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) within a prescribed time. CSC hearings are public unless the employee requests a closed hearing and those who appeal discipline decisions have the right to representation. The Polis-Change Integration team was informed that LBPB officers routinely request closed hearings.

CSC hearings are recorded, and the CSC is empowered to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for records.²⁹ Failure to comply with a subpoena or the Civil Service Rules can be punished as contempt.³⁰ The CSC determines whether to sustain the appeal, reduce the discipline, or deny the charges (findings). To “sustain the appeal” means to uphold the discipline as originally determined, while “reducing the discipline” means to uphold the original complaint finding but lessen the discipline in some respect. If the CSC “denies the charges,” the finding underlying the discipline is overturned.³¹

²⁸ City of Long Beach, California - Charter, Section 1103; Civil Service Rules, Section 76.

²⁹ Civil Service Rules, Sections 79 and 82.

³⁰ Civil Service Rules, Section 82.

³¹ Civil Service Rules, Section 83.


The Polis-Change Integration team was informed that approximately 50% of appeals considered by the CSC are filed by LBPD officers, though appeals from LBPD officers were delayed during COVID when in-person hearings were not permitted, and employees elected to not agree to voluntary virtual hearings. However, the Polis-Change Integration team was told that when appeals have moved forward, issues concerning the quality of CPCC or Internal Affairs investigations generally do not come up.

During the years 2017 – 2020, there were twenty-two hearings, with discipline sustained (upheld) in thirteen cases and denied (overturned) in 3 cases, with all overturned cases involving civilian employees. The remaining six appeals either were settled or resulted in a reduction in discipline.

The following is an overview of the investigation process as CPCC and IA investigate the same police misconduct complaint, make recommended findings, and final findings are determined by the City Manager’s Office.

Figure 4. Citizens Police Complaint Commission (CPCC) Complaint Investigation Process Map

Citizens Police Complaint Commission (CPCC) Complaint Investigation Process Map





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III. Benchmarking Study

Before discussing the methodology used by the Polis-Change Integration team for the benchmarking study, it is useful to consider the variety of oversight models found across the country. As has been stressed throughout this report, no two oversight entities are identical and there is no one “best” oversight program. An oversight agency’s structure, authority, budget, and other factors are shaped by community goals, along with political forces, resource availability, and other factors, at a particular point in time. Programs often evolve as they mature, as more is learned about the strengths and weaknesses of a model or program as it is implemented and new concerns about policing arise in the jurisdiction.

Despite the variety of models and ever-evolving nature of civilian oversight, the scheme commonly used by scholars and practitioners to classify oversight entities categorizes programs as review-focused, investigative-focused, and auditor/monitor-focused.³²

- *Review-focused*: The earliest and most common oversight model is review-focused, comprising 61.8% of the 157 oversight programs in the U.S. The review-focused approach provides community members outside of and unaffiliated with a law enforcement agency authority to review the quality of misconduct complaint investigations handled by the overseen police agency. Review-focused oversight programs often have other duties such as receiving and referring complaints to the overseen agency, requesting further investigation of cases found to be incomplete, and recommending case findings. Approximately half of agencies using this model of oversight review both internal and external complaints, while half only handle external, community generated complaints. Review-focused programs are less likely to have comprehensive access to the law enforcement agency’s records and data and only one-third have subpoena authority.
- *Investigative-focused*: Investigative-focused programs are much less common, with only 18.5% of U.S. oversight entities primarily working to investigate misconduct complaints. Professionally trained staff conduct investigations of misconduct allegations outside of the police agency overseen, with some investigative-focused programs handling only external complaints and others replacing the traditional internal affairs function entirely. Other investigative-focused entities only handle certain types of misconduct allegations, such as misuse of force, in-custody deaths, or racial/sexual policing bias. Investigative-focused agencies generally have greater access to law enforcement agency records and data, though information is more likely sought through subpoena as compared to review-focused entities.
- *Auditor/monitor-focused*: Similar in numbers to investigative-focused oversight agencies, only 19.7% of oversight programs follow the auditor/monitor-focused model. This model represents a relatively recent innovation developed to have broader impacts on police organizations through systemic review of policy, training, and operations. Oversight programs using an auditor/monitor approach differ from court appointed monitors in that they are more permanent and generally can review a wide range of police issues, while monitors appointed under a consent decree are temporary and focused on specific reforms. Because oversight agencies using the auditor/monitor model tend to have broad mandates, they also tend to have broader access to law enforcement

³² Vitoroulis, McElhiney, and Perez, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field*, 17. The descriptions of the three primary oversight models borrows heavily from this report.



records, data, and personnel. To the extent they are monitoring misconduct investigations, most auditor/monitor oversight programs focus on ensuring complaint investigations overall are done objectively, thoroughly, and in a timely manner, rather than handling individual investigations themselves.

Although “the review-focused model is the most prevalent form of civilian oversight in the United States...the auditor/monitor-focused model has become increasingly common since 2000.”³³ And, as has been noted elsewhere, most U.S. oversight programs have a primary focus that is review, investigative, or auditor/monitor oriented, but borrow aspects of other models to become “hybrid” models, which might entail overlapping functions within one hybrid agency or multiple agencies performing different functions in the same jurisdiction.

The CPCC evaluation work plan provided for a benchmarking study of other civilian oversight programs to identify any gaps in CPCC’s processes and for consideration in developing recommendations for an alternative oversight model for Long Beach. The consultants have conducted similar studies in other contexts and brought insights from that earlier work to this benchmarking study. The Polis-Change Integration team also worked with the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) to receive data NACOLE has collected from oversight agencies across the United States. The team initially reviewed data related to 26 California oversight programs, in addition to CPCC. The team then was asked to refine the data to focus on five (5) California oversight programs in cities of similar size to Long Beach, along with four (4) oversight agencies outside California in cities of similar size. Ultimately, because laws relating to policing and oversight differ in other states, the team focused on the five California cities of similar size. The team also notes below aspects of the Los Angeles Police Commission’s Office of Inspector General since it is in a neighboring jurisdiction and was mentioned as being well regarded by several Long Beach stakeholders. In Section V. Recommendations, discussion about some of the ways the proposed model of oversight would work draws on examples from the benchmarking study. Some of Polis-Change Integration team’s findings and recommendations below also highlight gaps identified between how CPCC currently functions, and examples of how other similar oversight programs fulfill their mission.

The following chart summarizes some of the information collected in the benchmarking study about the five California oversight agencies in cities of similar size as Long Beach. The information was developed in reliance on data reported in the Civilian Oversight Agency Directory (COAD) developed by NACOLE with support from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).³⁴ COAD collects survey data self-reported by participating oversight agencies. The COAD survey asks 36 questions resulting in 69 variables relating to organizational structure, resources, and authority of the responding agencies. Because many agencies completed the survey as early as 2017 when COAD launched and others underwent change pursuant to charter amendments in response to George Floyd’s murder, some of the COAD data is out of date. The Polis-Change Integration team has updated information where possible but was not able to confirm all specifics reported in this chart, particularly with regards to staff size and budget. The team determined an agency’s model type based on information about all functions filled, though its model type in COAD or elsewhere might be categorized differently.

³³ Ibid., 20.

³⁴ https://www.nacole.org/recent_reports

Figure 5. Oversight Agencies in California Cities Similar in Size to the City of Long Beach

Oversight Agencies in California Cities Similar in Size to the City of Long Beach*

Agency Name and Location	Oversight Model	Number of Paid Staff	Total Budget for Agency	Agency Reports To	On Scene for Critical Incident Investigations	Subpoena Authority and Access to Information
OIR Group/Independent Monitor (OIR) and Police Review Board (PRB) Anaheim, CA	Hybrid (Auditor/Monitor & Review-focused)	1	\$125,000 (OIR) and \$5000 (PRB)	City Manager	Yes (both OIR and PRB)	No subpoena authority; unlimited access
Office of Independent Review Fresno, CA	Hybrid (Auditor/Monitor & Review-focused)	2	\$287,900	City Manager	Yes	No subpoena authority; unlimited access
Oakland Police Commission (OPC) and Community Police Review Agency (CPRA) Oakland, CA	Hybrid (Auditor/Monitor & Investigation-focused)	15 (OPC) and 14 (CPRA)	\$4,320,000 (OPC) and \$2,889,000 (CPRA)	City Council	Yes (both OPC and CPRA)	Both have subpoena authority; unlimited access addressed in law and department policy
Community Police Review Commission Riverside, CA	Review-focused	1	\$160,020	City Manager	No	Subpoena authority unclear; unlimited access
Office of Public Safety Accountability (OPSA) and Community Police Review Commission (CPRC) Sacramento, CA	Hybrid (Auditor/Monitor & Review-focused)	5	\$882,273	City Council	Yes	OPSA must request subpoena through City Council; access addressed in policy

*Source: Civilian Oversight Agency Directory (COAD), National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), <https://www.nacole.org/coad>; updated with publicly sourced information as of January 14, 2022. As noted above, some of the information presented has not been confirmed or updated.

Of the five cities in California of similar size to Long Beach that have police oversight mechanisms in place, four have adopted hybrid models that include Auditor/Monitor functions. Anaheim, Oakland, and Sacramento also have Police Commissions. All four Auditor/Monitors included in the chart are authorized to be on the scene following a critical incident, such as an officer-involved shooting or traffic accident following a police pursuit, and Police Commission members in Anaheim and Oakland can also observe critical incident investigations. Some Auditor/Monitors, such as in Anaheim, also participate in later departmental reviews of critical incidents, can provide input as the investigation of a critical incident is underway, and audit all use of force, whether a critical incident is involved or not. All these Auditors/Monitors make improvement recommendations regarding individual incidents and broader police policy, training, and operational issues.

All five of the oversight models included in the benchmarking chart have some role with regards to misconduct complaint investigations, with four taking a review-focused approach and one that is focused on conducting independent investigations. The Auditor/Monitors in Anaheim and Fresno audit closed Internal Affairs investigations, with the Anaheim Auditor/Monitor looking at a sample of cases while the Fresno Auditor/Monitor reviews most closed misconduct investigations handled by Internal



Affairs or referred to supervisors. In Sacramento, the Auditor/Monitor audits all citizen complaints, can request further investigation, as needed, and can independently investigate any matter at the direction of City Council. The Community Police Review Agency (CPRA) in Oakland is mandated to investigate complaints from the community involving certain types of allegations, such as dishonesty or racial profiling, and has authority to investigate other matters. Its investigation is conducted parallel to the investigation done by Internal Affairs. Both recommend a finding and discipline for sustained cases to the Chief of Police. If the Chief disagrees with CPRA's recommended finding and/or discipline, the case is referred to a subcommittee of the Police Commission which makes a final determination after hearing from both CPRA and Internal Affairs.

The Commissions/Boards in Anaheim and Sacramento do not have investigative or disciplinary authority. The Anaheim Police Review Board provides a problem-solving function for community members raising concerns by facilitating communications with the Police Department and can request that the Auditor/Monitor review a specific complaint investigation if the complainant is unsatisfied with the outcome. The work of the Community Police Review Commission (CPRC) in Sacramento is directed by City Council. For example, in 2019, Council directed the CPRC to evaluate and engage the Sacramento community on the Police Department's use of force policy, police interactions with the mentally ill, and the use of BWCs. The Commission held ten public meetings, held discussions with the Police Department, conducted additional research, and then issued recommendations for improving and enhancing accountability and trust in the Police Department.

Though the Los Angeles Police Commission's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was not included in the benchmarking chart, as the Polis-Change Integration team was asked to highlight oversight in cities similar in size to Long Beach, several internal and external stakeholders pointed to the OIG as exemplary in its oversight approach. All misconduct complaints are routed to the Los Angeles Police Department for investigation, though OIG has real-time direct access to the investigation database and receives briefings on investigations, allowing it to monitor the investigation process. OIG staff are notified anytime there is a serious use of force and respond to the incident scene to monitor the incident investigation. Both the Department and OIG conduct reviews of the incident and make recommended findings about the officers involved. The Department's and OIG's findings are presented to the Police Commission which makes a final determination in closed session. If the matter is sustained, the Chief of Police determines discipline or other remedial action. The OIG also conducts audits and systemic reviews of police policy, training, and operations.

As previously noted, there is no "perfect" oversight approach that fits well in all communities. Each of the individual oversight agencies described fulfills its mission in different ways, even when categorized under the same type of model. The recommendations developed by the Polis-Change Integration team rely on observation and experience with a variety of oversight agencies, including those in the benchmarking chart, along with vital input from internal and external stakeholders and perspectives offered by the City of Long Beach project team.

IV. Findings

This section outlines the evaluation findings, which are based on all stakeholder input received, our review of a wide range of documents, the benchmarking study, and the observations and expertise of the Polis-Change-Integration team. These findings include observations on what appears to be effective with the current CPCC oversight system and areas for improvement. Generally, with regards to areas for improvement, the findings can be categorized into 1) Findings related to inherent limitations of the CPCC model and 2) Findings related to how the Commission functions, how CPCC and IA interact, and how CPCC fits within the larger structure for determining misconduct complaint investigation dispositions. There is some overlap in these categories.

What works well with CPCC

While there is room for improvement which is discussed below, it's important to recognize that the CPCC has provided some measure of oversight of the Long Beach Police Department for approximately 30 years. Professional, experienced CPCC investigators have had the opportunity to investigate civilian complaints and the Commission has had access to this confidential information for review and making recommended findings, providing a civilian perspective on what otherwise would be a closed system. The City Manager's Office expressed appreciation for the quality control function served by having an entity outside of Internal Affairs involved in the investigative process. And some Commissioners noted the benefit of having a rotating group of community representatives involved in reviewing cases, learning more about policing in the process, and then sharing that learning with others (without violating confidentiality requirements).

While some internal and external stakeholders opined that having civilians involved in the misconduct complaint investigation process improved police-community trust in Long Beach, the majority of those who provided input believed that the lack of transparency and CPCC's limited access to LBPD data detracted from CPCC's legitimacy as an oversight entity.

Limitations inherent with CPCC's original structure

The CPCC program, including both staff and its voluntary Commission, can most accurately be categorized as an investigative-focused model with some aspects of the review-focused approach (see Figure 1). Considering the feedback received from internal stakeholders and the community, as well as what we learned in our observations and document review, we found that there are significant limitations inherent in the oversight model created by Charter in 1991. Most specifically, the current model as structured does not meet the City's or the community's calls for increased transparency, accountability, and input on addressing broader organizational culture issues within the Long Beach Police Department.

Finding 1. CPCC and the Long Beach Police Department (including Internal Affairs) both report to the City Manager's Office, resulting in a perceived (and potential actual) conflict of interest.

"One of the most important and defining concepts of civilian oversight of law enforcement is independence," which is imperative for an oversight's program to be successful and viewed as legitimate.

³⁵ In their 2021 report, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement*, Vitoroulis, et. al discuss three types of independence: structural independence, political independence, and operational or process

³⁵ Ibid., 63-64.



independence.³⁶ Structural independence refers to an oversight program being “clearly and distinctly separate, administratively or organizationally, from the overseen law enforcement agency, and that the civilian oversight agency is not obligated to report to political bodies inextricably related to the law enforcement organization.” The first two findings under limitations inherent to the original Charter Amendment relate to CPCC’s real or perceived lack of structural independence.

The original 1991 Charter Amendment provides that CPCC is to make investigatory recommendations to the City Manager, “who shall have final disciplinary authority.”³⁷ After the CPCC staff investigates a misconduct complaint and the Commission recommends findings, the case is referred to the Deputy City Manager to make a final finding recommendation to the City Manager. The Deputy City Manager also receives a copy of the Internal Affairs investigation and findings on the same case and meets separately with the Internal Affairs Commander and the CPCC Manager to resolve any questions before making a recommendation on a final disposition. A memorandum of explanation is written if the finding differs from what was recommended by the CPCC. In addition, the LBPDP Chief of Police reports to the City Manager.

Some internal and external stakeholders voiced concern that conflicts could arise given that the Police Department, Internal Affairs, and the CPCC all report into the City Manager’s Office, particularly since CPCC is intended to be an independent oversight entity. While no specific conflict incident was noted, the lack of transparency about the final decision-making process (discussed below) contributes to those concerns. A perception of conflict has similar impacts as an actual conflict.

Finding 2. CPCC and LBPDP both relying on the same attorney from the City Attorney’s Office results in a perceived (and potentially actual) conflict of interest.

Stakeholders raised the issue that having the same attorney from the City Attorney’s Office provide counsel to both CPCC and Internal Affairs (and other LBPDP units) creates potential or actual conflict of interest. The Charter mandates that the City Attorney’s Office is the “sole and exclusive legal advisor of the City, City Council, and all City Commissions, committees, officers, and employees,”³⁸ making this issue more difficult to address. However, in early fall 2021, after the Polis-Change Integration team flushed out this issue during interviews and listening sessions, the City Attorney’s Office appointed separate counsel for CPCC and the LBPDP, including Internal Affairs. This step should help alleviate concerns, particularly if there is a firewall between counsel and a clearly articulated policy about their separate duties, prohibitions against sharing information, and a protocol for resolving conflicts that might arise, particularly as information is funneled upwards to supervisors, managers, and the City Attorney.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ However, a City of Long Beach organizational chart dated 2013 located through an on-line search showed CPCC reporting to the Mayor and City Council. <https://www.longbeach.gov/globalassets/finance/media-library/documents/city-budget-and-finances/budget/budget-documents/02-fy-16-preface> Perhaps under that scheme, CPCC referred investigation finding recommendations to the City Manager, but otherwise reported to the Mayor and City Council.

³⁸ <https://www.longbeach.gov/attorney/about-our-office/what-we-do/>



Finding 3. The Charter Amendment did not account for the need to conduct frequent outreach with the community.

Conducting regular outreach to the community and other stakeholders is essential to civilian oversight effectiveness.³⁹ Community engagement facilitates community education about the oversight program, helps build relationships with stakeholder individuals and groups, provides a mechanism to solicit input about policing issues of concern and ways to improve oversight operations, and is vital to improving relationships, building coalitions, and developing a greater capacity for problem-solving.⁴⁰

Community engagement is not addressed in the Charter Amendment and has not been a priority for CPCC staff or the Commission. While shortly before Polis-Change Integration began its work, the CPCC Commission formed a committee to conduct outreach, it was put on hold following a lengthy review and approval process by the City Manager’s Office, which was frustrating for Commissioners, and pending outcomes from the evaluation. The purpose of the committee was to educate the community about the authority CPCC does and does not have, and the committee did not intend to engage in interaction with any audience to hear feedback or receive complaints.

Finding 4. The lack of subpoena enforcement and Commission hearings frustrates community members, particularly when the City offers no clear explanation regarding this process.

Different oversight models require different types of authority to accomplish their work and meet the mandate of a City Charter or enabling legislation. For example, investigation-focused entities “must have the ability to interview all witnesses, including officers, and obtain relevant evidence and documents for each investigation.”⁴¹

The Charter Amendment provides that CPCC has subpoena authority to require the attendance of witnesses, and the production of books and papers pertinent to the investigation and to administer oaths to such witnesses to the extent permissible by law.⁴² However, while CPCC does issue subpoenas for information from the LBPB, it has not sought to enforce any subpoena in the face of routine delay in production or outright refusal to produce certain types of information. Officers are not required to submit to interviews by CPCC staff and audio recordings of officer statements to Internal Affairs were only provided as of January 2021.⁴³ According to Internal Affairs, only interviews in those cases that are to be reviewed by LBPB commanders, the Chief of Police, and others⁴⁴ are transcribed, while all other cases – the great majority - are not transcribed.

Counsel from the City Attorney’s Office recently indicated a willingness to pursue subpoena enforcement, though others have opined that enforcement is not possible. Thus, it is not clear if the lack

³⁹ Walker, Samuel. *Police Accountability: The Role of Civilian Oversight*. First edition. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2001); De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement*, 42-43.

⁴⁰ Vitoroulis, McElhiney, and Perez, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field*, 71 (citations omitted).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁴² City of Long Beach, California – Charter, Article XIA, Section 1153.

⁴³ Written transcripts of these recordings are not provided, however, resulting in many hours devoted by CPCC investigators in providing transcription. It is not clear why the written transcripts have been withheld.

⁴⁴ Because the Internal Affairs investigations in these cases are compiled in red folders, they are unofficially referred to as “Red Book” cases by LBPB and others involved with the review of LBPB misconduct investigations.



of enforcement is a function of what is essentially “toothless” authority under the Charter Amendment or represents a long-established norm of not requiring the LBPd to comply with CPCC subpoenas.

The Charter provides authority to conduct a hearing into allegations of police misconduct, when such hearing, in the discretion of the Commission, will facilitate the fact-finding process, with hearings open to the public to the extent legally possible.⁴⁵ The City Attorney’s Office indicated that the Commission’s monthly review of completed investigations to make recommended findings constitutes a hearing as contemplated under the Charter, while many community stakeholders understand a “hearing” to involve witness testimony, which does not take place. The Charter language on hearings also gives the Commission discretion about holding hearings and it’s conceivable that witnesses could be called, but no Commission has elected to do so in 30 years or at least as far back as anyone interviewed can remember. Regardless of what was intended by the Charter, any hearing involving witness testimony would be handled in closed session, given how state law confidentiality requirements have been interpreted by the City of Long Beach.

Finding 5. Parallel investigations result in inefficiencies and squandered resources through duplicated steps by CPCC and Internal Affairs.

When the Charter created a system of parallel investigations by Internal Affairs and CPCC, citizens voting for this approach to civilian oversight perhaps did not anticipate the inefficiencies that would result or believed that they were the price of oversight. However, 30 years later, many stakeholders point to the wastefulness inherent in the process, particularly given that CPCC does not have full access to LBPd information and personnel, so many CPCC investigations are incomplete. Finding recommendations are made even if the CPCC has not been provided with all evidence available to the LBPd Internal Affairs and, given this, it is understandable why the City Manager’s Office might arrive at a different final disposition than that recommended by CPCC. There is clear inefficiency in the system if CPCC does not have access to all information relevant to a complaint investigation, but nonetheless completes its work and the Commission expends time reviewing the matter and recommending a finding, only to have the City Manager base its final finding on facts only available to Internal Affairs. At a time when all municipalities struggle to fund services and address community needs, such inefficiency also results in squandered resources.

Finding 6. CPCC is the only City of Long Beach Commission with two-year term limits and a maximum of two terms, resulting in some Commissioners leaving CPCC at the height of their effectiveness.

Volunteer boards and commissions “should have staggered terms and term limits for its members so as to introduce fresh perspectives while maintaining institutional knowledge.”⁴⁶ The Charter provided for staggered terms and term limits, though some unintended consequences have been reported.

The Charter provides that Commissioners be appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by City Council, with one member representing each of the nine City Council districts, and two members appointed at large. Each City Council member is to nominate an individual to represent each respective Council district. The term for each Commissioner is two years, with no person serving more than two full terms.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ City of Long Beach, California - Charter, Article XIA, Section 1154.

⁴⁶ Vitoroulis, McElhiney, and Perez, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field*, 93.

⁴⁷ Ibid.



Of twenty-eight (28) City of Long Beach commissions, the CPCC Commission is the only one limited to 2 years and 2 terms, for a combined 4 years of service.⁴⁸ For example, Civil Service Commissioners are appointed for 3-year terms and can serve 2 terms, for a total of 6 years and Airport Advisory Commission members serve 2-year terms for up to 4 terms, for a combined 8 years of potential service. It is not clear why CPCC's Commissioner term limits were set lower than others, but the result can be that Commissioners roll off CPCC at a point when they've become more comfortable with LBPB policy and operational practices, such that they could serve as important guides for newly appointed Commissioners.

Functional limitations of CPCC model

In addition to the inherent limitations of the model related to the structure and authority created by the 1991 Charter Amendment, we also found a number of functional limitations with the CPCC model. While the City of Long Beach should be commended for instituting a civilian oversight model in advance of many cities in the State of California and around the country, an important aspect, as evidenced by this evaluation, is the need to continuously review and evaluate its oversight program to ensure that it continues to meet the evolving needs of the city and the community. Findings related to the functional limitations of the CPCC model are noted below.

Finding 7. Commissioners are not provided the extent and depth of training needed to analyze misconduct complaint investigations thoroughly and objectively.

Upon being appointed as Commissioners of the CPCC, Commissioners are provided with confidentiality agreements, orientation material, and attend an orientation training. This training is co-facilitated by the City Attorney and the CPCC Manager. Training consists of an overview of applicable laws and CPCC policies and procedures. The orientation also includes discussion about the history of the CPCC, perceptions and realities about the Commission's work, and the CPCC's value to the City of Long Beach. This training is conducted over 1.5 hours and occurs prior to new Commissioners attending their first meeting. Commissioners also attend an annual all-day retreat that focuses on special topics training. For example, previous annual retreats included training on racial profiling and handcuffing. Due to COVID-19, no annual retreats were conducted in 2020. An annual retreat series of virtual open session presentations were conducted in 2021.

Many of the Commissioners interviewed noted the need for additional training and stated that while the orientation training was helpful, much of what they needed to know was learned "on the job" and ad hoc. For example, Long Beach Police Department policies are considered along with case packets and not extensively reviewed during orientation and prior to onboarding. Many of the Commissioners interviewed stated their general unfamiliarity with departmental policy, though they are provided with specific, relevant policy references as part of their case packet reviews.

Observations of CPCC Commission meetings and the virtual orientation training were helpful to the Polis-Change Integration team in understanding the extent of the training and the impact the limited training has on the facilitation, substance, and focus of the discussion at the CPCC meetings. The orientation training observed by the Polis-Change Integration team covered important topics at a very high level and unnecessarily included discussion on complex issues being explored through the evaluation,

⁴⁸ CPCC Commissioners may serve longer if they initially fill a vacancy created by someone leaving before the end of their term. City of Long Beach, California - Charter, Article XIA, Section 1151.

i.e., access to the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (CLETS).⁴⁹ Some topics covered, for example the definition of each finding, could have been done more effectively with case examples to help new Commissioners better understand subtle distinctions between the findings. The orientation also did not delve into detail on any LBPDP policies, particularly those that frequently arise in the investigation of complaints. And finally, a discussion on credibility determinations is useful, though also complex and deserving of more detail and time. Further, in our observations of the closed Commission meetings and review of cases, the team did not note any discussion of the step-by-step credibility determination process, despite the diagram included at the end of each case packet.

Finding 8. Commissioners do not consistently consider all evidence and do not analyze evidence in the context of the specific policy at issue.

Commissioners receive on average of 8-10 cases to review one week prior to the Commission meeting. Each case packet is lengthy and can take several hours or days to thoroughly review. The Polis-Change Integration team acknowledges the commitment on the part of the Commissioners to review these cases in detail prior to each meeting and to discuss their review of these cases in person once a month. These meetings often go late into the night as Commissioners collectively discuss each case. However, in observing several Commission meetings, it was noted that at times the discussion into the various aspects of a case was superficial and failed to delve into the detail surrounding the facts of the case and/or related departmental policy or law. In many cases, the Commissioners over-relied on the BWC video, if available, to frame the discussion around their determinations and findings. This was also most apparent in considering the final few cases in those meetings in which the reviews continued into the late-night hours.

Finding 9. There is no feedback loop to help Commissioners understand final findings that are different from what they recommended, undermining the Commission's learning and development.

Many of the interviewees noted that little information about the outcomes of a case, such as whether the Commission finding was upheld or overturned by the City Manager's Office, or actions taken to address the issues raised (i.e., changes to policy, training), is shared with CPCC staff, Commissioners, or the community. The City Manager's Office has recently tried to address this by tracking and coding the final findings; however, based on an initial review of Manager Reports provided to the Commission, it does not appear this new process adequately addresses this issue.

Finding 10. CPCC does not have access to the same information or officers as IA does, potentially impacting the thoroughness of CPCC's investigations.

The Polis-Change Integration team notes that there are a couple factors contributing to this finding. In most cases, the discrepancy in the level of relevant case information was because Internal Affairs had not completed their investigation when the case was sent to the CPCC for review. Information pertinent to the case was sometimes added to the Internal Affairs case brief after the fact and before the City Manager's final review. In other cases, the issue stemmed from the Commissioners and the CPCC

⁴⁹ The California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) is a computer network that gives police departments access to national databases maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS), the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and others. Only authorized law enforcement and criminal justice personnel can access CLETS information, which is confidential and only for "official use." A background check, fingerprinting, and training is required before accessing the system.

<https://oag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/clcts-ppp.pdf>

staff's inability to access the CLETS system. Because of the sensitivity of the information in this system, access to this system is limited by State law to law enforcement and criminal justice personnel and a background check, fingerprinting, and training is required for any person who has CLETS access, to ensure that the public's most sensitive information is protected and not inappropriately accessed or shared. There is also a lack of clarity around who can access the CLETS system and/or the information obtained from the system. Interviewees noted that at times information from the CLETS system was inadvertently included in the case files sent to the CPCC investigators. Further, it was noted that the City Manager's Office and the City Attorney can view summary information derived from the CLETS system and/or information obtained from the CLETS system, but do not have specific CLETS access.

The discrepancy in the level of access to case information presents larger issues and questions around the level of transparency, the comprehensiveness of the CPCC investigations and Commission reviews, and ultimately, legitimacy in the process.

Finding 11. LBPB's failure to provide officers' compelled statements to CPCC until January 2021 resulted in recommended findings based on incomplete evidence and explained some differences in the final findings from the City Manager's Office.

Further contributing to the issues noted in the above finding was the prior legal inability of the LBPB to provide officers' compelled statements to the CPCC. Before January 2021, based on an opinion from the City Attorney's Office that compelled statements constituted personnel matters required to be kept confidential, these statements were not provided. This resulted in some instances in which the final finding from the City Manager's Office differed from that of the Commission. Since January 2021, audio recordings of officers' statements, when available, have been provided to the CPCC investigators. CPCC staff then make transcriptions of these audio recordings which are provided to the CPCC Commission.

Expectantly, transcription can take hours over several days to complete depending on the length and number of the recordings, and thereby creates inefficiencies in the process, duplicative work between the CPCC and IA, and potentially duplicative expenses for transcription services.

Finding 12. There is no system for filing a misconduct complaint on-line, with either the LBPB or CPCC.

A number of the participants at our listening sessions and those that responded to the City of Long Beach's survey about the CPCC noted unawareness of how to file a complaint against a LBPB officer. In examining this further, the Polis-Change Integration team found that, for a member of the public to file a complaint, they must first navigate the CPCC or LBPB website to find the complaint form and then print, complete, sign, and mail or bring in person the form to CPCC or LBPB. This cumbersome process can discourage some from filing a complaint. Further, the lack of community outreach on the part of the CPCC may also be a contributing factor to the public's unfamiliarity with the process.

Finding 13. Complainants are not provided with a user-friendly explanation of the investigation process and a year can go by between CPCC's first contact with complainant and receipt of the final letter of determination, with little or no contact in between.

The current complaint investigatory process can take over a year from the time in which a complaint is submitted to when the final findings letter from the City Manager's Office is sent to the complainant. The LBPB complaint investigation process can take 180 days or more, with the CPCC process to finalize its investigation and submit the case to the Commission for review adding another 60-90 days.



Further, the City Manager Office review and final disposition can take an additional 60-90 days, if not longer.

Many interviewees noted that while complainants receive an initial letter acknowledging receipt of their complaint, a letter informing them that their complaint will be reviewed by the Commission, and a letter at the conclusion of the review of the complaint, little information is shared during the lengthy investigation and review process noted above. Further, the letters provided often lacked detail about the process, timeline, next steps, findings, outcomes, or what to expect, much less clarification on what information can and cannot be shared with the complainant.

Finding 14. The timeliness of investigations and final findings review inhibits comprehensive investigations by the CPCC and legitimacy of the process.

As noted above, issues with the timeliness of the City Manager’s finding determination and submission of the related memo documenting the review further extends the overall timeline to complete an investigation of a complaint. As of November 2021, it was noted to the Polis-Change Integration team that over 90 allegations were awaiting a final finding from the City Manager’s Office, some of which represented complaints received in 2020. This delay is not explained to complainants and trickles down to the timeliness of the CPCC annual reports and any analysis of the complaints received by the CPCC.

In addition, interviews with CPCC staff highlighted the lack of timeliness of IA investigations and its impact on ensuring that cases were reviewed and investigated before the case timed out, meaning that the matter was not resolved within the time limit for a sustained finding and discipline where evidence supported such an outcome. CPCC investigators often had limited time to conduct their investigations for review by the Commission before the files timed out.

Finding 15. Community members noted that Commissioners were not often reflective of the Long Beach community.

Commissioners are selected by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council. The eleven Commissioners represent each Council district and two at large. Commissioners are to be “broadly representative of the racial, ethnic, religious, labor, business, age gender, sexual orientation, and disabled members of the general public.”⁵⁰ Interviewees noted that the Commissioners selected by the Mayor and City Council were not often reflective of the broader Long Beach community and were more reflective of who they knew and/or had frequent contact with.

Finding 16. CPCC and the public do not receive summary information or trend analysis data from LBPD on internal investigations, which can feed an assumption that LBPD does not hold officers accountable for their misconduct.

Lack of transparency can fuel misperceptions about how agencies, both police and civilian oversight, hold officers accountable and address systemic issues of misconduct. A general theme in Polis-Change Integration’s findings stem from issues of transparency. As part of its evaluation the team observed a command level review of an internal complaint investigated by LBPD Internal Affairs. The observation was helpful to the team in understanding the LBPD internal processes for reviewing misconduct cases, particularly internal complaints that are not investigated by the CPCC. Because there are no summary information or trend analysis reports provided by LBPD, the public and CPCC are unaware

⁵⁰ City of Long Beach, California - Charter, Article XIA, Section 1151. Membership and Terms of Citizen Police Complaint Commission. <https://www.longbeach.gov/citymanager/cpcc/supporting-information/#charter>



of the Department’s efforts to address misconduct. Constraints over being unable to share information that may potentially include officer identifiable information are used to explain why data, such as trend analysis and summary information about incidents of misconduct, is not shared with the general public. However, other California oversight programs publish such data while protecting the identify of specific officers involved in misconduct complaints (see discussion related to Recommendation 1 below).

Finding 17. The CPCC does not have the authority to add new allegations to complaint investigations.

While Internal Affairs can add allegations to those initially raised by a complainant, this authority is not given to the CPCC. In some of the case reviews observed by the Polis-Change Integration team, it was noted that the inability of the CPCC Commissioners to add allegations limited their ability to produce accurate and comprehensive findings based on the evidence presented by CPCC staff. In some cases, Commissioners offered policy or training recommendations as part of their findings to address an issue not included in the complaint allegations. Also, the Commission on occasion sustained an allegation where evidence to sustain the included allegation was missing, to address their inability to add an appropriate allegation. Thus, in instances where an allegation may have not been assigned by Internal Affairs, because the CPCC was unable to add an allegation and despite evidence in support of the addition, the effect limits CPCC’s ability to conduct a thorough investigation and issue findings on all aspects of a complaint.

Finding 18. The findings categories used by the CPCC in review of complaints constrain its ability to accurately document all cases in which misconduct is found as well as make recommendations to training and policy changes.

The CPCC currently uses seven different finding categories. These include:

Receive and file: When information is received which, on its face, does not establish misconduct it is received and filed. The case may be reopened if further information or evidence is submitted within a year of the department’s discovery of the alleged act.

Unfounded: The investigation indicates that the alleged act did not occur. By way of example, there is no information or evidence that supports the allegation, the complainant has been found to be untruthful, or the individual named in the complaint was not involved.

Exonerated: The investigation indicates that the alleged act did occur, but the actions taken were justified, lawful and proper.

Not Sustained: The investigation fails to disclose sufficient evidence to prove or disprove the alleged act. By way of example, the officers deny the allegation and there are no independent or unbiased witnesses or other evidence to support the complainant’s allegation.

Sustained: The investigation indicates by a preponderance of evidence the alleged act occurred and said act constitutes misconduct.

Other/training: The investigation indicates the alleged act occurred but fails to rise to the level of misconduct and would be most appropriately handled by training or other means.

Re-investigate: When new information comes to the attention of the Commission or Commissioners, or additional witnesses have been identified and were not interviewed during the initial investigation, the case could be classified as “re-investigate.”



The Polis-Change Integration team noted the overlap and lack of clarity on how a few of these finding categories are used. This was made most apparent in the team's observations of the CPCC Commission meetings. Commissioners often had difficulty distinguishing when and under which circumstances to apply a given finding. Some of this confusion stemmed from the overlap between *Sustained* and *Other/training*, both of which are to be used if the Commission finds that the alleged act occurred. Some of this uncertainty stemmed from the Commissioners not fully understanding the departmental disciplinary procedures. Further, the Polis-Change Integration team notes that sustained complaints, in most agencies, depending on the degree of misconduct, might result in supervisory coaching and/or remedial training. The *Other/training* finding category also refers to the actions that the department should take after the fact, though is in reference to non-punitive discipline.

Finding 19. CPCC staff noted that some of its processes could be improved with additional staffing.

CPCC is currently comprised of (1) Manager, (1) full time investigator, (1) part-time investigator, and (1) part-time administrative assistant. The CPCC Manager reports to the Deputy City Manager, who in turn reviews all CPCC reports, reviews CPCC Commission recommendations, resolves any discrepancies between recommended findings from Internal Affairs and CPCC, and makes final complaint finding recommendations to the City Manager. The CPCC also has an internship program. Interns provide administrative support, help summarize packets, and pull together case packets. CPCC staff noted that many of the office's limitations, such as gaps in engagement with the community and high caseload distribution among the investigators, are due to the need for additional staff, including administrative support. Staff noted that the administrative assistant currently assigned to the CPCC is assigned as part-time and is also assigned to provide administrative support to other offices within the City of Long Beach. Further, investigators noted that their caseload has recently increased now that they are reviewing No Further Action (NFA) cases. Some investigators are effectively investigating on average 80 cases per year, not including NFAs.

Finding 20. There are no formal Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) for the CPCC and no established written agreements between the CPCC and the LBPB.

Upon review of documents and related policies and procedures, the Polis-Change Integration team noted that no formally established standard operation procedures for the CPCC were available. Further, no written agreement between the CPCC and the LBPB was in place providing guidance on the types of information Internal Affairs must provide to the CPCC, the timelines involved, and other procedures. Many of the systems in place were conducted as they had been in years prior with little or no consideration for improving processes or formally institutionalizing protocols and procedures.

Failure to institutionalize practices such as information and data sharing protocols in a written agreement leaves room for miscommunication and increases the lack of follow through by both parties. These issues can be further exacerbated with changes in leadership in both LBPB IA and the CPCC. A written agreement establishing protocols between an oversight agency and the police agency overseen is a best practice in civilian oversight and fosters greater collaboration between the two.

Similar concerns arise when an oversight program fails to institutionalize its own processes in an SOP. Making explicit the myriad of processes involved with complaint investigations,⁵¹ the roles and

⁵¹ See, e.g., Attard, Barbara and Kathryn Olson. *Police Misconduct Complaint Investigations Manual*, 2nd ed. (Routledge: 2020).



responsibilities of staff, and performance measures all serve to establish expectations for staff and provide transparency and accountability for oversight efforts. Failure to document such processes diminishes the oversight agency's ability to ensure standardization and continuously improving quality assurance in its work.



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V. Recommendations

As noted in the Introduction to this report, the following recommendations are organized in two categories representing 1) a structure the City of Long Beach should consider for an oversight model and 2) improvements it can make to the CPCC in the interim. The Polis-Change Integration team acknowledges that implementing the changes necessary to establish a new oversight model will take time and is dependent on approval of Long Beach voters to amend the City Charter and the availability of resources necessary for the new program. It is with this understanding that the Polis-Change Integration team stresses the importance of the interim recommended improvements for the CPCC, while preconditions are met for the new model.

Further, it is also important to understand the context in which the following recommendations are made. The Polis-Change Integration team reviewed extensive documentation, policies, procedures, and legislation; benchmarked the CPCC against other oversight programs in California and outside the state; and gathered perspectives from both internal and external stakeholders. This data, along with the team's extensive expertise on civilian oversight matters, provided the foundation for the recommendations noted below.

Recommendations for an Oversight Model

The overarching recommendation from the Polis-Change Integration team is for the City of Long Beach to adopt a new oversight model. The recommended approach is one grounded on the principles of the auditor/monitor-focused model and includes attributes of both the investigation-focused model and the review-focused model, along with a Police Oversight Commission.

The recommended Auditor/Monitor hybrid model and Police Oversight Commission represent the best approach to meeting the needs of the city and community and offer an opportunity to significantly increase police accountability and transparency in Long Beach.

Recommendation 1. The City of Long Beach should adopt a hybrid Police Auditor/Monitor oversight program with broad authority and include a Police Oversight Commission.

This should include authority to:

- Address systemic issues, analyze patterns and trends, and identify deficiencies in LBPD operations, policy, procedures, and training.
- Audit a sample of completed investigations, including both internal and external complaints, every month for timeliness, thoroughness, and quality.
- Review Internal Affairs intake of complaints to ensure the appropriate allegations have been included for investigation.
- Investigate specific types of issues, such as complaints against the Chief or Command Staff, complaints involving a conflict with Internal Affairs, an officer-involved-shooting, an in-custody death, or other critical incident, when requested or approved by the City Manager's Office; and
- Review all major uses of force.
- Attend on the scene critical incident investigations.

As previously noted, the current CPCC model has not provided the transparency and accountability for the Long Beach Police Department that is expected of a robust oversight program, and both the



Department's and the CPCC's legitimacy suffer, as a result. From the community's perspective, both the Internal Affairs and CPCC investigation processes lack transparency. Some of this lack of transparency is directly attributable to the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, though other oversight programs in California do regularly provide more summary information about complaint investigations than the CPCC. For example, both Fresno's Office of Independent Review and Sacramento's Office of Public Safety Accountability publish reports with more detailed information about complaint trends, including time to complete investigations and discipline outcomes for sustained cases.⁵² The Office of Independent Review also provides summaries of Fresno Police Department Internal Affairs investigation case facts, allegations, and policies, though does not include the names of officers involved. Both Fresno and Sacramento programs also provide summaries of officer-involved-shootings and other critical incidents, with recommendations for addressing identified concerns about the events. Whether or not Long Beach concurs that more information about investigation trends can be shared with the public, ***by restructuring the oversight model away from a primary function of investigating complaints, the Auditor/Monitor's Office should be able to publish more information about its work and that of the LBPD without implicating individual officers' rights under state legislation and, thus, provide more transparency.***

The model that is recommended is intended to provide the Long Beach community with an oversight program that has more authority and the potential for a broader impact on the LBPD as an organization. While it is imperative that there be a system for investigating complaints of police misconduct, any oversight program that primarily handles or reviews misconduct investigations is focused on the minority of officers who receive complaints, with only a relatively small subset of that group who are found to have engaged in misconduct and receive discipline. Consequently, the impact of civilian oversight on broader organizational culture is limited in investigation-focused models like the CPCC.

The hybrid Auditor/Monitor model proposed takes the oversight program out of day-to-day investigations but will have authority to review cases in progress by, for example, attending witness interviews in a matter of particular interest. The Auditor/Monitor also will have authority to consider complaints on the front end, to ensure all appropriate allegations are included and investigated. The Auditor/Monitor's Office also will sample closed investigations to assess them for objectivity, thoroughness, and timeliness, identifying whether there are any trends in the investigations requiring attention, such as the frequent use of leading questions or regular failure to canvass witnesses for video recording of police incidents. Currently, CPCC only has jurisdiction over external complaints from community members, so including authority to review internal complaints also is an expansion of authority in this area. Related to this oversight of all internal and external complaints, the Auditor/Monitor should attend and participate in case review meetings, when the Chief, Commanders, and others review complaint investigations and determine allegation findings and discipline. Finally, by request of or with approval of the City Manager's Office, the Auditor/Monitor should have authority to investigate certain cases such as those involving the Chief or Command Staff, where Internal Affairs has a conflict, or

⁵² For a sample report from the Office of Independent Review, see: https://www.fresno.gov/citymanager/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2021/10/2021_3rd_Quarter_Report.pdf. A sample report from the Office of Public Safety Accountability can be found at: <http://www.cityofsacramento.org/-/media/Corporate/Files/OPSA/OPSA-Annual-Report-2020.pdf?la=en>



complaints flowing from a critical incident in which the Auditor/Monitor's involvement would help insure a thorough and unbiased investigation.

The primary work of the Auditor/Monitor's Office will be to conduct systemic reviews of LBPB operations, policy, procedures, and training. Working with the Police Oversight Commission, auditing priorities will be developed in response to community concerns or other indicators that a matter should be systemically reviewed. For example, the Auditor/Monitor might review a specialized unit's compliance with policy and procedure, focus on police response in a specific part of the City, consider the LBPB's early intervention policy and its impacts, or analyze police traffic stops for a set period. These are just examples and are not intended to imply recommended priorities or limitations on the topics that could be reviewed.

Oversight authority in Long Beach is also extended in the proposed model by providing that the Auditor/Monitor can be on scene for investigations of critical incidents, such as officer-involved-shootings, an in-custody death, or large public demonstration, and will review all major uses of force. Being on the scene after a critical incident allows the Auditor/Monitor to observe how officers handle the initial investigation that occurs after a significant police event, without interfering in the process. During review of a major use of force incident, the Auditor/Monitor can rely on their own observations of the scene when considering evidence collected and witnesses interviewed, helping to ensure a thorough review and to identify any misuse of force, policy violation, and/or training opportunities.

Recommendation 2. The Auditor/Monitor oversight program should have broad, direct access to departmental personnel and information, databases, and other records.

To maximize the utility of the Auditor/Monitor's involvement, it is imperative that there be broad, direct access to LBPB personnel and records. An early step in rolling out the new model should be the creation of policies and procedures that detail how the Auditor/Monitor will access people and information. At least initially, a Commander, potentially within the Professional Standards Unit or Internal Affairs, should be identified by the LBPB Chief to serve as a primary point of contact at the Department to facilitate the Auditor/Monitor's access to records and other information and to help resolve any issues that arise, with the City Manager's Office intervening if there is unreasonable delay or other access obstacles. Similarly, if someone in the Department was not clear about protocols for the Auditor/Monitor's involvement in IA cases, a use of force review, or otherwise, the same point of contact Commander could quickly resolve the matter. Over time, as trust builds between the LBPB and the Auditor/Monitor's Office, the need for a point of contact should be reduced or obviated.

Recommendation 3. The LBPB should be required to respond to the Police Auditor/Monitor's recommendations within 30 days with a plan to implement the recommendation or an explanation as to any rejection, with the City Manager resolving any disagreement if the Auditor/Monitor continues to pursue the matter.

Currently, CPCC makes policy and training improvement recommendations to the City Manager's Office for referral to the LBPB, but the outcomes are not clear. For example, in CPCC's 2019 Annual Report, eleven (11) policy questions and recommendations were listed, but there is no indication as to whether the Department accepted the recommendations or otherwise followed up with the CPCC or the public concerning these matters. Under the recommended model, LBPB must provide an initial response within thirty (30) days, unless the Police Auditor/Monitor explicitly agrees to an extension of time, with a plan and timeline for moving the recommendation forward or an explanation as to why it does not accept the recommendation. If the Auditor/Monitor is not persuaded by an explanation provided, the



recommendation can be taken to the City Manager’s Office for resolution. The Auditor/Monitor’s Office and Commission should include information on recommendations and the LBPD’s responses in the annual reports issued to the public.

Recommendation 4. The Auditor/Monitor under the program should be hired by City Council in a process that is transparent and involves community input.

The oversight model should be situated in the larger Long Beach government structure such that there are checks and balances between City Council and the City Manager’s Office to support the Auditor/Monitor’s Office’s independence and discourage political or other undue influence on the work of the Office, while ensuring consistency with City personnel practices and other City-wide policies and procedures. It is recommended that City Council oversee the hiring of the Auditor/Monitor because it is best situated to facilitate a transparent process that involves community representatives and allows for community input. The Police Commission should play an active role in this process, such as contributing to the job description, narrowing the list of candidates after reviewing applications, or participating in candidate interviews. The City Manager’s Office would handle personnel issues for the Auditor/Monitor’s Office, help coordinate with the LBPD and other City offices, and provide support for City Council reporting, but should not dictate work priorities for the Auditor/Monitor or have veto power over reports that are issued. For example, if the Police Auditor/Monitor recommends that LBPD change a particular policy, even if the City Manager’s Office disagrees with the recommendation, the matter should be presented to City Council. Similarly, if the Police Auditor/Monitor has a concern that requires more immediate attention, such as determining that the process for reviewing a major use of force incident is seriously lacking, the City Manager’s Office should not require that the Auditor/Monitor reserve criticism until the matter is thoroughly reviewed internally and on the City Manager’s Office timetable. All reports should be directed to both City Council and the City Manager’s Office.

Recommendation 5. The Auditor/Monitor’s Office should be sufficiently staffed and resources to fulfill the roles and extended authority created under the model.

As the oversight model continues to develop within the framework recommended by the Polis-Change Integration team, the specific staff required to meet its mission must be clarified. At a minimum, it is anticipated that staff likely would include:

- The Auditor/Monitor
- One staff person to manage the audit function
- One staff person responsible primarily for review of use of force and other critical incidents
- One to two people to handle the investigation allegation review function and monthly sampling of closed investigations
- One person overseeing community engagement and report writing
- One fulltime administrative assistant supporting the Auditor/Monitor’s Office and Commission

While the figure well may be miscalculated, based on limited information about other Auditor/Model models in California in similarly sized jurisdictions and with input from City budget personnel, it is estimated that the Auditor/Monitor’s Office would require an initial annual budget of approximately \$1,434,936, an amount that is approximately \$900,000 higher than current CPCC annual budget.



Recommendation 6. The Police Oversight Commission under the new model should be repurposed to assume a different role than that filled by the CPCC Commission.

The Police Oversight Commission's authority should include the ability to:

- Provide input to the Auditor/Monitor on setting auditing priorities and to review and approve recommendations from the Auditor/Monitor.
- Solicit input from the community on recommendations under consideration, with each Commissioner bringing input from their respective district and the Commissioners appointed at large bringing input from affinity or other groups that cut across the entire City.
- Provide feedback to the Auditor/Monitor on annual reports focused on statistical trends and special reports directed to matters of particular interest to the community or addressed by the Auditor/Monitor through the audit and review process.
- Educate and engage with the community and bring community concerns to the attention of the Auditor/Monitor and the Long Beach Police Department.
- Receive private briefings on high-profile incidents.

As discussed above in the Findings section, the Charter Amendment that led to the creation of the CPCC did not account for the role it should play in fostering community engagement, though it is essential for the success of any oversight program. The model proposed involves the Commission in community engagement as a central part of its duties, with support from the Auditor/Monitor Office staff. The Commission will act as liaison of sorts, between the Long Beach community and the Auditor/Monitor, educating the public about the role of oversight in Long Beach and sharing and collecting information relevant to the work of the Auditor/Monitor Office. Commission members should not actively solicit complaints but should be prepared with information to share about how to file a complaint and where to get more information.

Commissioners should work with the City Council Member from their district in developing an outreach plan, to connect with individuals and groups around policing issues. As input from a Commissioner's district is gathered and shared along with that from other Commissioners, the Commission can use the information in recommending areas on which the Auditor/Monitor might focus. For example, if several Commissioners reported that residents complained about open air drug markets in areas that were not regularly patrolled by the LBPd, this information could result in the Auditor/Monitor planning a review of the process by which the Department selects areas of the city for emphasis patrols.

The Commission also will provide input to the Auditor/Monitor's Office on information important to include in published reports and can share the reports in their assigned district to educate the public about the work of the Auditor/Monitor's Office. Oversight reports sometimes can be overly technical, and Commissioners can assist the Auditor/Monitor's Office in determining whether some material from a report should be presented in a more concise format using a lay person's terminology. Often oversight agency reports are only published online and are not accessible to some segments of the community without computer access. Individual Commissioners will be able to help determine if there are groups who would benefit from having access to hard copies of the report or copies published in other languages.

The Police Oversight Commission should receive briefings from the LBPd and Auditor/Monitor on high-profile incidents for the purpose of understanding how the event will be reviewed, referred to Internal Affairs if needed, or otherwise processed by the Department. It's possible the briefings can be



done without divulging confidential information, as the focus should be on explaining how the LBPB provides accountability in such incidents. The Commission could then share this overview when meeting with community groups to provide assurance about how the incident will be handled and the role the Auditor/Monitor will play in investigating/reviewing the event. However, just as the CPCC Commissioners are exposed to confidential information through the complaint investigation review process, the Police Oversight Commissioners might also be privy to certain confidential information to facilitate their understanding of an incident, following an individual commitment to respect the need for confidentiality.

Recommendation 7. Commissioners in the Police Oversight Commission should be representative of the City of Long Beach community and selected through a transparent process that involves the community.

City Council members should seek community input during a transparent process when selecting CPCC Commissioners. Calls for nominations of community members to serve on the Commission should be shared using the City’s communication channels, i.e., newsletters, website, social media, and direct outreach to community leaders and stakeholders. Not only will this garner interest and input from a broader section of the community, it also will help to increase transparency in the process.

Recommendation 8. The Auditor/Monitor Office should identify performance measures and a feedback process to gauge its impact and success as a civilian oversight program.

From its inception, the Auditor/Monitor Office should identify performance measures and a feedback process to gauge its impact and success as a civilian oversight program. Periodic evaluations are important to identify strengths of the program and where improvements are needed, understand how personnel and budget resources are being used and whether other resources are needed, appreciate accomplishments of the Office, and gauge public satisfaction. Evaluations can be conducted by the City Auditor’s Office or another appropriate internal source or by an external entity such as a panel of community members or an oversight consultant and should include feedback forms for complainants or others who interact with the Office, a community survey, or other feedback processes. Performance measures should be identified by policy or SOP and “evaluation requirements must take into account the evaluation’s scope, frequency, and allocated resources.”⁵³

Recommendation 9. The City of Long Beach should identify any related Charter amendment proposals and legislative priorities that may be necessary to realize the preceding recommended reforms.

Many aspects of the new oversight program and the necessary Charter amendment(s) will emerge after the consultants have completed their work with Long Beach. It is recommended that the City build on the work of this report and the roadmap outlining the steps to be taken and timeline for proposed changes to the Charter with a more specific implementation strategy that recognizes the evolving nature of setting up a new oversight model in Long Beach. Representatives from the CPCC, community members, and City personnel with special expertise in creating and staffing a new function should be involved in the implementation process.

Recommendation 10. The City of Long Beach should conduct an in-depth and independent evaluation of the LBPB Internal Affairs Division.

Conducting an evaluation of the LBPB Internal Affairs Division’s policies and procedures will be vital to not only the changes made to the CPCC in the interim but also those made as part of instituting a new oversight model. While outside the scope of the Polis-Change Integration’s evaluation of the CPCC,

⁵³ Vitoroulis, McElhiney and Perez, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field*, 133.



the entwine and overlap between the CPCC's investigations and that of Internal Affairs is apparent in many aspects of the CPCC's work (see Figure 4 and discussion in Section II. About the CPCC). In conducting its evaluation of the CPCC, the team identified various areas in which LBPB's process for investigating complaints at times hampered CPCC's ability to conduct timely and comprehensive investigations. The lack of policy and procedures for how Internal Affairs handles complaints, both internal and external, made it difficult to determine at times whether problems resulted from IA's own processes or were a function of how the IA interfaces with the CPCC. These pinch points, as well as other issues with LBPB's Internal Affairs investigatory process identified throughout this report should be explored further. This review of Internal Affairs could be an initial task taken on by the Police Review Commission in coordination with the Police Auditor/Monitor, under the broader authority recommended in the new hybrid model.

Recommendations for Interim Changes: Improvements to the CPCC

As noted above, the implementation of the oversight model will take time. Before a Charter amendment is presented to the electorate, it first needs direction from the City Council on the general approach and a meet and confer with employees as required by State law. Proposed changes to the City Charter can then be presented to the electorate and, assuming approval, additional budget and personnel resources will need to be designated for the model. As such, the Polis-Change Integration team provides the following recommendations for interim changes to the CPCC.

After its analysis and interviews with both external and internal stakeholders and observations of CPCC meetings, it was abundantly clear to the Polis-Change Integration team that changes to the CPCC were much needed. Many interviewees noted that the CPCC has not been re-evaluated since its creation, 30 years ago. The recommendations provided below identify the changes that could be made to the CPCC immediately to begin to address some of the feedback from the community and findings from the evaluation.

Recommendation 11. The City of Long Beach and the CPCC should explore and institute various methods to increase transparency with complainants throughout the investigatory processes.

To the extent allowable by the current charter and state legislation, the CPCC should increase the transparency of its investigatory processes. The CPCC should establish formal protocols and procedures to continually keep the complainants apprised of the status of their complaint. The Polis-Change Integration team acknowledges limitations placed on the CPCC in sharing certain information due to state legislation but encourages the City of Long Beach and the CPCC to consider the types of information it can share. For example, status updates on the case should be periodically provided to complainants. The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that in addition to the initial letter, the letter to inform the complainant about the CPCC Commission meeting where the investigation of their complaint will be reviewed, and the final findings letter, the CPCC also should communicate every 3-4 months via email, phone, or letter with updates on the progress of the investigation. The team also recommends that the letters currently provided to the complainant include additional information. For example, the initial letter could outline in greater detail the process, establish some expectations on the timeline, and refer the complainant to the applicable laws/rules that prohibit the CPCC from sharing detailed information about the investigation. Similarly, the findings letter could also include reference material on the findings categories and other avenues that complainants can use to file a complaint, such as with the District Attorney and US Attorney. This is similar to what is provided by the LBPB on their website's Internal Affairs page.



Recommendation 12. The City of Long Beach and the CPCC should increase transparency with the community by improving its website, reporting, and community outreach efforts.

The CPCC should examine its website to ensure that it is user friendly and accessible to the public. The website could be improved by providing the public with quick easy access to file a complaint online or detailed information about the complaint investigation process, both of which should be readily accessible on the CPCC homepage. Further, upcoming meetings and events should also be readily shared on the website's homepage.

The CPCC should also consider hiring a public relations specialist or obtain services through City of Long Beach resources to support CPCC's communication efforts. This person should be tasked with creating, expanding, and maintaining CPCC's active presence on social media, and creating and widely distributing monthly or quarterly newsletters informing the community about its activities. The person filling this function should also be tasked with working with the Director or Manager to distribute and share with the community informational material about the CPCC, the solicitation and appointment of new CPCC Commission members, its annual reports, upcoming CPCC meetings, and/or other community events. This person should coordinate their efforts with the CPCC's Community Engagement Committee (see Recommendation 13).

Recommendation 13. The CPCC should reinstate its Community Engagement Committee.

The Polis-Change Integration team acknowledges that the capacity for the CPCC to conduct community engagement is limited, since it is primarily focused on investigations and does not have the staff or resources necessary for effective public outreach. However, the team still encourages the CPCC to increase its community outreach efforts. Reinstating its Community Engagement Committee is one avenue the CPCC could use to do this. The primary objectives of the Community Engagement Committee should be to inform the community about the CPCC and reform efforts. We found that the lack of community engagement on the part of the CPCC thus far is a contributing factor to the issues and questions surrounding its legitimacy and transparency. The team also learned through its interviews and listening sessions that there seemed to be a general unawareness of the CPCC, its role, and the complaint process.

The Committee should be tasked with actively engaging with the community by attending city sponsored events, neighborhood association meetings, and the like, to share with the community more information about the CPCC and how to file a complaint or commendation about a Long Beach Police Department officer. The CPCC should also leverage City sponsored events to conduct outreach and collaborate with LBPD in presenting at such events. These activities should provide the opportunity for the CPCC to increase awareness of its function, the role of the Commissioners, and the commitment of the CPCC to an objective, thorough, and fair complaint process.

As noted in Recommendation 18, part of the effort in establishing a standard operating procedure for the CPCC should be outlining the approval process necessary, if any, for the CPCC Commission to conduct community outreach.

Recommendation 14. The City of Long Beach should provide additional training and orientation to CPCC Commissioners.

The Commissioners would benefit from additional training related to the findings categories, the case review process, their role, and the scope of the CPCC, and should include a walk-through of the



complaint review process. For example, the training observed by the Polis-Change Integration team would have benefited from providing Commissioners with specific examples of cases for each finding category they are to consider when reviewing case packets. The lack of clarity on which finding to apply to a case, because of confusion over differences between the findings, was a regular occurrence at the CPCC meetings. Further, an in-depth understanding of how Commissioners should be conducting case reviews, materials to review, and aspects of the case investigation to consider would go a long way in educating them on how to properly conduct a case review. The orientation training should also include more in-depth discussion and review of LBPD policies, particularly those that frequently come up in cases.

While required in the past, the practice of Commissioners going on a ride-along has been all but eliminated. Commissioners should be encouraged to participate in several ride-alongs throughout the duration of their appointment. Similarly, Commissioners should also be encouraged to observe LBPD training sessions. Although some of the Commissioners noted that they had visited the LBPD training academy in the past, these efforts were not described as frequent or consistent, though all Commissioners who mentioned having participated noted the utility of such exposure. Participating in ride-alongs and training sessions enhances understanding of how policies and procedures that are relevant to their case reviews are covered in officer training and put into practice. The LBPD Community Police Academy is another program that the CPCC could leverage to ensure the Commissioners have a broader understanding of LBPD operations.

Recommendation 15. The City of Long Beach should provide opportunities for CPCC Staff to participate in professional development training and to network with other civilian oversight practitioners.

The training provided to the CPCC investigators is extensive and the investigators have the expertise necessary to conduct their work. In furthering these efforts, the Polis-Change Integration team recommends that CPCC staff are provided with the opportunity to attend related investigatory training provided by NACOLE and other organizations where they might further advance their knowledge and skills. Budgetary support should also be provided for investigators to attend related conferences and trainings sessions on topics such as conducting investigations, interviewing witnesses, and general civilian oversight practices, along with specialized topics such as de-escalation or biased policing.⁵⁴

Training through NACOLE and networking with staff from other civilian oversight programs will broaden CPCC staff's knowledge and ensure a greater learning environment within the CPCC.

Recommendation 16. The City of Long Beach should increase staffing within the CPCC Office.

As noted in our benchmarking study, staffing ratios vary largely across similar jurisdictions in California. However, the City of Long Beach should consider increasing staff to address some of the areas for improvement, in the interim, noted throughout the report. Assigning a dedicated administrative assistant should be a priority for the Office. The City should also consider onboarding additional staff to assist the CPCC with its efforts to increase community outreach and to assist and work with the CPCC Community Outreach Committee to create greater awareness of the CPCC and its work and efforts to increase transparency. Finally, additional personnel to help with the complaint investigation caseload would be greatly welcomed by the current CPCC staff.

⁵⁴ A sample list of training topics related to police misconduct complaint investigations and training resources can be found in Attard and Olson, *Police Misconduct Complaint Investigations Manual*, 69-72.

Recommendation 17. The CPCC and the LBPD Internal Affairs should establish a written agreement about information sharing.

The written agreement should formally document the complaint investigatory process for both the CPCC and IA. It should also outline the information sharing and communication protocols between both entities, formally establish timelines for when complaints are shared with the CPCC and vice versa, clearly identify the types of information collected by Internal Affairs that can and cannot be shared, and outline the role, if any, for IA at Commission meetings.

Recommendation 18. The City of Long Beach should establish a standard operating procedure for the CPCC Office.

Similarly, the City of Long Beach and the CPCC should institutionalize its procedures in a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP should formally outline the office procedures, mission, objectives, and goals of the CPCC Office. The SOP should also include the following:

- Outline the processes for the intake, tracking and investigation of complaints
- Outline the roles and responsibilities of the members of the office: Director, Manager, investigators, administrative staff, public relations staff, and Commissioners
- Establish the internal and external Information sharing processes
- Outline performance measures for evaluating the office's performance and the impact of its activities
- Establish procedures for reporting and sharing of information about its activities (i.e., annual reports, newsletters)

The SOP should also, most importantly, align with the procedures noted in the written agreement with the LBPD.

Recommendation 19. Communication of case outcomes, including rationale for changes, should be promptly shared with CPCC Office Staff and Commission Members.

The CPCC and the City of Long Beach should consider establishing a process for sharing case outcomes with the CPCC staff and Commissioners. This will not only encourage greater transparency but also ensure increased procedural justice and promote learning opportunities for both Investigators and Commissioners.

Sharing these outcomes will enhance the investigators and Commissioners' understanding about how their investigations and deliberations/reviews could be improved to produce more comprehensive and supportable outcomes. Increasing the communication of case outcomes not only improves internal transparency, but also legitimacy.

Recommendation 20. The City of Long Beach should provide clarification around the access of information required for thorough and timely complaint investigations.

The City of Long Beach should research and clearly understand alternative interpretations regarding procedures and requirements for direct access to the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and options available regarding access to information obtained through CLETS. Interviewees noted that this distinction is not clear and hinders CPCC's ability to ensure its investigations are thorough. The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the CPCC Manager and Investigators be provided with direct access to the CLETS system, following satisfaction of all



mandated requirements prior to access. If the City is unable to acquire CLETS access for the CPCC staff, a next best alternative would be that they are provided access to information obtained from the CLETS system, with Internal Affairs including all such information along with other evidence in investigative files shared with CPCC.

The Commissioners do not need direct access to CLETS themselves; however, in some cases the information pulled from the system would benefit their review of complaint investigations and ensure that the Commission’s recommended findings are based on all relevant and available evidence.

However, if Recommendation 22 is fully implemented, and Commissioners are provided with case briefings and written analysis as part of their case packets, then access to the information is not entirely necessary for the Commissioners, especially if these changes are interim to the broader remodeling of oversight in Long Beach. In any event, providing this information to the Commissioners, either through information obtained through CLETS or summations within the CPCC Investigator case file analysis will provide for more complete and thorough investigations and better-informed findings recommendations.

Clarifying these issues surrounding CPCC’s direct access to CLETS and access to information obtained through CLETS is vital to CPCC’s independence and the legitimacy of the oversight process. If CPCC staff and Commissioners cannot be provided information obtained through CLETS, despite the relevance of the CLETS information to the complaint investigation, it will be challenging for CPCC Investigators to be confident they are conducting thorough investigations and for Commissioners to make recommendations based upon all relevant evidence.

Recommendation 21. The CPCC must address issues with the timeliness of the CPCC and IA complaint investigatory processes, including seeking subpoena enforcement with support from the City Attorney’s Office.

Clear and established timelines for both the IA and the CPCC complaint process would be beneficial. According to the LBPD policy, IA investigations should be completed within 180 days. Extensions to this timeline are approved by the IA Commander. In many instances, the CPCC investigation cannot be completed until after the IA investigators have completed and submitted their investigation to the CPCC, though some CPCC cases are reviewed by the Commission without officer statements or other relevant evidence important to a thorough investigation. Although the CPCC investigation is independent of the IA investigation, the CPCC relies on information gathered by IA to conduct their investigations and prepare the packets for the Commissioners. This in effect extends the CPCC investigation, which according to policy should be completed within 90 days. Further, these issues have a continued ripple effect on the ability for the Commission to review cases before a case times-out and in the timeliness of the City Manager’s final finding.

While a subpoena for information is issued to IA when CPCC opens a new case, CPCC has not taken steps to enforce a subpoena in the face of IA delay in providing information responsive to the subpoena. While indicating they would hope to informally resolve any subpoena disputes, counsel from the City Attorney’s Office indicated a willingness to pursue a subpoena enforcement action, an approach the CPCC should consider. The scope of the Polis-Change Integration evaluation was limited to that of the CPCC investigatory process of complaints. As part of the effort to address issues with the timeliness of its complaint investigations, the City should also examine the ways in which the LBPD IA could improve the

timeliness of their investigations and determine if the Unit would benefit from additional personnel and/or increased training for its investigators (See Recommendation 10).

Adjustments to these timelines should also be established as part of the CPCC SOP and written agreement with the LBPD IA.

Recommendation 22. CPCC investigators should include a witness/evidence matrix and a written analysis of each case as part of the case packets provided to the CPCC Commissioners.

The witness and evidence matrix should outline the related policies, witness statements, and evidence presented in the case packet. This matrix will assist the Commissioners to refer to pertinent information more easily within the case packets. Not only will a matrix streamline the Commissioners' review of the cases, but it will also ensure that their reviews are more comprehensive, and that they are more well informed of all the aspects and considerations of each case.

Along the same lines, the CPCC investigators should provide a written analysis of the case. The analysis should be based on facts found in the investigation of the case, and a summary of the factual evidence as it relates to each policy at issue should be included as part of the packet provided to Commissioners. Like the matrix, this will ensure that the Commissioners have a comprehensive understanding of all the facts in the case as well as an understanding of the department policies and procedures related to the allegations in each case. The timely production and completion of the IA investigation is essential for the CPCC investigators to produce comprehensive case briefings, including a witness/evidence matrix and written analysis of each case. And new CPCC staff may be necessary, also, for there to be capacity for creating a witness/evidence matrix for all investigations.

Recommendation 23. The CPCC Investigators should conduct case fact finding presentations as part of each CPCC meeting.

In addition to including a witness/evidence matrix and case analysis as part of each case packet, the CPCC investigators should also conduct brief fact-finding presentations at the start of the review of each case. These presentations should outline the information presented in both the evidence matrix as well as the case analysis. These presentations will help to focus the Commission's reviews and discussion and ensure that they have a comprehensive understanding of all the facts available in the case to make informed findings.

Like the written analysis included as part of the case file, the presentation should focus on the evidence gathered, the facts determined in the case, highlight the related policies, review the specific allegation at issue, etc. In effect, this serves as a detailed presentation of the written analysis contained in the case file.

The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the City implement this and the prior recommendation in order to eliminate or minimize the need for the City Attorney and IA Commander to attend these meetings and, in effect, improve the Commission's independence. The City Attorney and IA Commander could be on-call during the Commission meetings and available should any questions arise.

Recommendation 24. The CPCC should clarify communication protocols for the CPCC staff, City Attorney, and IA during Commission meetings.

Alternatively, if the above two recommendations are not implemented, the CPCC should consider establishing protocols around open dialogue between the Commission, CPCC staff, and the IA Commander



during its meetings. These improved protocols should be outlined in the SOP and written agreement previously discussed. The protocols should outline the circumstances in which the above listed representatives should provide commentary during the Commission meetings without unduly influencing the Commission's deliberation process or the outcome. Specifically, the protocols should provide the opportunity for the CPCC staff, IA Commander, or Deputy City Attorney to provide notations about evidence that the CPCC may have failed to consider in their deliberations, departmental policies related to the allegations, or related laws or legal considerations, respectively. The Commission should be involved in developing the protocols and should have the prerogative at any time to indicate comments from CPCC staff, IA, or the Deputy City Attorney are not necessary and to reject or disagree with any perspective or information offered.

Recommendation 25. The CPCC Commission should consider alternative approaches to handling the No Further Action cases, so the full Commission is not reviewing in detail all such cases.

No Further Action (NFA) cases are defined as cases that are closed due to lack of witness cooperation or insufficient information, or staff have determined that the statute of limitations period for a disciplinary action has expired.⁵⁵

Although NFAs are no longer being reviewed by the CPCC Commissioners, they are being reviewed and classified as such by the CPCC Investigators. The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the CPCC establish a rotating subcommittee of Commissioners to review the NFA cases and validate the CPCC Investigator's process of classifying such cases as NFAs. This review should occur as soon as feasible after the case is classified as NFA, allowing time for an investigation if the Commission disagrees. This will ensure greater legitimacy in the process and provide an avenue for the Commissioners to provide input on cases that may have been incorrectly categorized as NFAs, while also not burdening their reviews with cases that need not be fully investigated.

Recommendation 26. The CPCC should consider restructuring its finding categories, particularly the "Other/training" finding.

The Polis-Change Integration team recommends the City and the CPCC establish a "Supervisory Intervention" finding category. This finding should take the place of the "Other/Training" finding (see following recommendation) and be used when "The investigation indicates the alleged act occurred but fails to rise to the level of misconduct." This will allow the CPCC to more accurately capture those cases in which the alleged policy violation did occur but was handled by the supervisor by way of non-punitive discipline such as supervisory coaching. Because of the stigma associated with a sustained finding and discipline, the "Supervisory Intervention" finding provides a formal alternative for low-level out-of-policy conduct and assures that the conduct will be addressed. For example, if policy requires that an officer contact their supervisor directly if they will be late or miss a shift, but an officer instead asks another patrol officer on the same shift and assignment to convey the message, this isolated technical policy violation could best be addressed with training. It is imperative that LBPD have a system to ensure that the necessary training or other intervention takes place and in a timely manner.

⁵⁵ CPCC Investigator Training Manual (2019).



Recommendation 27. The CPCC should create a new finding category of “Policy/Training” as a means to recommend Department-wide changes to policy and/or training to address issues identified in the review of complaints.

Currently the Other/Training findings category is defined as, “The investigation indicated the alleged act occurred but fails to rise to the level of misconduct and would be most appropriately handed by training or other means” and while Commissioners sometimes use this finding as a means to recommend training, the use of this finding category should be reconsidered, in conjunction with the implementation of the above recommendation, to allow the Commission to make this finding in addition or ancillary to a primary finding. This finding category should be labeled as “Policy/Training” and be used when Commissioners provide policy and/or training recommendations to either address the incident-specific issues identified in CPCC’s investigation of a case or departmental-wide issues. This would allow for Commissioners to recommend training and policy revisions more readily that, while affecting the case under review, also seek to address potentially systemic issues within the LBPd.

Recommendation 28. The CPCC should track the status of policy or training recommendations made by the Commission.

In furtherance of the recommendation above, the policy and/or training recommendations made by the Commission should be formally tracked by the CPCC and noted as to whether recommendations were adopted or rejected by the LBPd. Along the same lines, the LBPd should be required to formally respond to the recommendations made by the CPCC. This process should be institutionalized in the written agreement discussed previously.

Recommendation 29. Establish guidelines and protocols for the City Manager’s timeline and procedures for reviewing and issuing final findings.

The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that a timeline of 30 days for the final finding review by the City Manager be established within the CPCC SOPs. The legitimacy of this process is reliant on the City adhering to this timeline and the timely delivery of the final finding memo to the City Manager and closing letter to the complainant. The CPCC SOP should also outline the procedures it should follow if the final findings memo is not received in the allotted time, i.e., provide a status update letter to the complainant, outline the formal notification process, and issue a report documenting delays.

Recommendation 30. The CPCC should consider the disadvantages of including the complainant’s criminal history as part of the case packets.

Including a complainant’s criminal history within a case packet creates perceptions of inequitable treatment, similar to the problem with including officer’s conduct or history of complaints as part of the review of the underlying incident. The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that CPCC should not consider a complainant’s criminal history during their review of case investigations and the information should not be included in the case packet.

Recommendation 31. The CPCC should consider the disadvantages of including an officer’s complaint history in the case packet.

Including an officer’s complaint history in the case packet is not relevant to the facts being considered by the CPCC and should only come into account, if at all, during the discipline stage and after a sustained finding based on the evidence at hand. Much like the above recommendation, including this information presents issues as the scope of the CPCC’s role does not include review or determinations of



discipline and having the information available potentially could create bias in considering the evidence presented for the case under review.

Recommendation 32. The City of Long Beach should assign the CPCC its own Deputy City Attorney to serve as legal representative.

A recurring issue that was mentioned by interviewees was lack of independent legal representation for the CPCC and the potential conflict of interest because the City Attorney assigned to the CPCC also served as counsel for the LBPD.

The Polis team acknowledges that the City of Long Beach assigned the CPCC its own Deputy City Attorney in November 2021 and thereby resolved this concern. The Polis-Change Integration team acknowledges that the role of the City Attorney's Office under the City Charter limits the CPCC's ability to acquire legal representation independent of the City.

Recommendation 33. The City of Long Beach should mitigate the potential for perceived or actual conflicts of interest by improving the City Manager's process for conducting final reviews of cases.

The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the Deputy City Manager meet with both the CPCC Manager and the LBPD IA Commander together to review cases and address any questions concerning the appropriate finding. This will ensure decisions are not made in a silo and reduce the likelihood of miscommunication and any perceived or potential conflicts of interest. Also, once issues are resolved around the discrepancy in the level of information provided to the Deputy City Manager versus the CPCC, any concerns with conducting these meetings jointly are eliminated (see Recommendation 20).

Perceived conflicts of interest can also be addressed by ensuring prompt delivery of the memos developed by the Deputy City Manager during this final review and issuing of the final finding. These memos, whether the finding agrees or not with the CPCC Commission's recommendation, should be developed for each case investigated by the CPCC.

Recommendation 34. Commissioners should be representative of the Long Beach community and the community should be involved with their appointment/selection.

The Polis-Change Integration team recommends that the City (Mayor and City Council Members) solicit greater input from the community in the process of selecting CPCC Commissioners. This input could include soliciting nominations from the broader community and not just City Council members or the Mayor. Calls for nominations of community members to serve on the Commission should be shared using the City's communication channels, i.e., newsletters, website, social media, and direct outreach to community leaders and stakeholders. Not only will this garner interest and input from a broader section of the community, it also will help to increase transparency in the process.

Recommendation 35. The City of Long Beach should consider renaming the 'Citizen Police Complaint Commission' to the 'Civilian Police Complaint Commission.'

If possible, without a need to amend the Charter, the City of Long Beach should rename the CPCC to replace "Citizen" with "Civilian." This change will demonstrate that the CPCC and the City acknowledges that it serves the entire community and is inclusive of those who may not be citizens, but who also reside within the Long Beach community.



Recommendation 36. The CPCC and LBPD Internal Affairs should work together with the City Manager’s Office to establish an alternative dispute resolution program.

Many low-level complaints can benefit from an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) option for handling the concerns involved, instead of the complaint being fully investigated.⁵⁶ ADR can be particularly useful when the complainant and the officer have different perspectives about the same incident and they might both be accurate, at least to some extent. For example, if an officer is eating lunch in a diner and suddenly leaves without paying to respond to a crime in progress, another patron might complain about the failure to pay because they are not aware of the emergency circumstances. The chance to sit together with an objective mediator to discuss the incident can go a long way in providing clarification and/or context to an incident and help both the officer and complainant have a better perspective overall about the incident and complaint.

If CPCC and the LBPD work together on an ADR program, the interests of both officers and the community will be brought to the table as program parameters are established. There are a host of considerations including: Should mediators be voluntary or paid? Should officers and complainants voluntarily go to mediation, or can they be required to attend? Are there types of allegations that should never be referred to mediation and/or types that usually should be at least considered?⁵⁷ Many oversight agencies throughout the country offer ADR, including some in California, and further guidance is available for establishing a program should the City of Long Beach elect to do so.⁵⁸ As the City moves forward with the recommended oversight model, the Auditor/Monitor’s Office should take over coordination in collaboration with the LBPD.

⁵⁶ LBPD policy provides for mediated resolution of some complaints, but it does not appear that the process is being used.

⁵⁷ Attard and Olson, *Police Misconduct Complaint Investigations Manual*, 17.

⁵⁸ For further information on oversight mediation programs and links to some examples, see Vitoroulis, McElhiney, and Perez, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field*, 53.



VI. Conclusion

Police oversight programs are just one piece to the larger puzzle that is police reform and not the panacea to addressing all police misconduct or organizational and operational issues. Collaboration between a police agency and its community, along with their commitment and willingness to come together to impart change can have far greater impacts on organizational culture and community satisfaction, especially when focused on departmental policy, procedures, training, and practice.

In conducting this evaluation, it was clear to the Polis-Change Integration team that change to the City's current oversight model is needed. Issues with transparency, independence, community engagement, and inability to impact broad reform within LBPB were recurring themes in our review of documents, observations of Commission meetings, and in conversations with both internal and external stakeholders. Further, oversight programs must be regularly assessed as the needs of the community and the city change along with ever-evolving legislation and current events, all which can impact the functions of an oversight program. With no such reassessment of the CPCC in over 30 years, this evaluation was even more important. Considering these factors, the Polis-Change Integration team recommends a model that is grounded on the principles of the auditor/monitor-focused model and includes attributes of both the investigation-focused and the review-focused models, along with providing for the Police Oversight Commission.

While it is vital that all police agencies have a system to investigate misconduct complaints that is timely, thorough, and objective, an oversight model that is primarily focused on complaint investigations might fail to appreciate significant issues in the police department that are not likely to surface in a complaint or that can't be assessed appropriately and broadly in the context of an individual complaint. For example, an individual complaint alleging an officer failed to activate their BWC might establish the officer's disregard for the policy requiring use of the camera, and may or may not uncover unclear or contradictory policies regarding mandatory BWC activation, technical problems with activating some cameras, lack of supervisory enforcement of the BWC policy, or other organizational issues that are not relevant to the specific complaint and cannot be attributed to the officer named in the complaint. The complaint investigation process necessarily focuses on the actions and motivations of the named officer and one complaint is not likely to uncover all of the other issues that could contribute to a suboptimal BWC program.

Similarly, the review-focused oversight model is concerned primarily with individual complaints and suffers from the same limitations discussed above regarding the investigation-focused model. However, the review-focused model has the advantage of continually providing feedback to Internal Affairs about individual investigations and, thus, contributing to improvements over time in the process. Anecdotally, some oversight agencies with a review-focused approach report collaborative relationships have developed with Internal Affairs as investigators interact with oversight agency staff. Nonetheless, both Internal Affairs and the oversight agency necessarily are concerned only with the case at hand and not with ways the case relates to other challenging issues in the department.

The Polis-Change Integration team has recommended the Police Auditor/Monitor and Police Oversight Commission approach because it holds the most reliable promise for enhancing police/community trust in Long Beach, by emphasizing the importance of collaboration between the LBPB and oversight program and recognizing the importance of community engagement and input in policing



and oversight processes. Rather than focusing on individual acts of alleged misconduct or individual “bad apples” in the department, the recommended hybrid model aims for broad systemic change and encourages the LBPd to be a learning organization that seeks to continually improve. Further, this model recognizes the importance of on-going community education about policing and community involvement in shaping the LBPd of the future.

In addition to the recommendation that the City take a new approach to oversight, the team acknowledges that establishing a new oversight program using a different model takes time and recommends that the City consider interim changes to the CPCC to address many of the functional limitations of the current model.



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About Polis Solutions & Change Integration Consulting

As a respected national leader in the development, implementation, and evaluation of evidence-based solutions to complex challenges in policing and criminal justice, Polis Solutions, Inc. partnered with Change Integration Consulting, LLC, to assist the City of Long Beach in evaluating the Citizen Police Complaint Commission and the City's overall response to complaints about the police. **Polis Solutions, Inc.** ("Polis") is a national research and training company that develops and implements customized, evidence-based solutions for police, criminal justice, and other organizations designed to improve safety and trust during face-to-face interactions. **Change Integration Consulting** offers consulting services for business, government, law enforcement, education, and other public-sector agencies, with a particular focus on addressing concerns with individual conduct and systemic policies and practices that undermine police professionalism and organizational legitimacy.

Our diverse team of nationally recognized professionals works collaboratively with law enforcement agency and community stakeholders to develop, implement, and evaluate reform initiatives designed to effect substantive change in the delivery of criminal justice services. Each member of our team has extensive experience working on complex, sensitive police reform efforts. We deliberately use best practices from procedural justice, scientific research, and evidence-based policing to carry out each project task.